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Compounding the Countermajoritarian Difficulty
Through “Plaintiff’s Diplomacy”: Can the
International Criminal Court Provide a Solution?
In the past twenty-five years the United States
has had three major exports: rock music, blue
jeans, and United States law. The first two
have acquired an acceptance the last can never
achieve. People resent being told what to do.
1

Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.
I. INTRODUCTION

The eighteen judges of the International Criminal Court (ICC),
2
each elected by a two-thirds majority of states parties to the ICC,
3
took their oath of office in The Hague on March 11, 2003. These
4
judges then selected by absolute majority one of their own—
5
Philippe Kirsch, a distinguished Canadian jurist —to serve a threeyear term as President of the ICC. No two judges may be nationals
6
of the same state, but no judge is a national of the United States. It
is true that on December 31, 2000, President Bill Clinton signed the
1. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 281 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. ICC, at art. 36(6)(a), U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
3. Keith B. Richburg, International War Crimes Court Is Inaugurated, but Without
U.S., WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2003, at A18, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
ac2/wp-dyn/A12630-2003Mar11.
4. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 38(1) (“The President and the First and Second
Vice-Presidents shall be elected by an absolute majority of the judges. They shall each serve for
a term of three years or until the end of their respective [nine year, nonrenewable] terms of
office as judges, whichever expires earlier. They shall be eligible for re-election once.”).
5. Marlise Simons, World Court for Crimes of War Opens in The Hague, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 12, 2003, at A10 (reporting the inauguration of the body of judges and their subsequent
selection according to Article 38(1) of the ICC Statute of Philippe Kirsch, a Canadian judge
and specialist on international law, as President and Akua Kuenehia of Ghana and Elizabeth
Odio Benito of Costa Rica as Vice-Presidents).
6. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 36(7)(a).
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final draft of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC
Statute or Rome Statute), adopted at the Rome Conference of July
7
17, 1998, despite “concerns about significant flaws in the Treaty.”
But he did this so that the United States would remain “in a position
8
to influence the evolution of the Court.” This controversial move
did not invite U.S. support of the ICC in the end.
To the contrary, the United States has wholly rejected the ICC
in the three years since President Clinton signed the final draft ICC
Statute. In doing so, the United States has argued both that U.S.
participation in the ICC would violate the U.S. Constitution and
that U.S. hegemony in a unipolar world would subject the United
States to politically motivated prosecutions in the ICC arising out of
U.S. peacekeeping activities. The constitutional concerns
surrounding U.S. participation in the ICC focus largely on
jurisdictional considerations and on vague or ambiguous language in
the ICC Statute’s definition of jurisdiction-conferring crimes.
But such arguments alone neither necessarily render U.S.
participation in the ICC unconstitutional nor even seem to
constitute the true U.S. objection to the ICC. Rather, these
arguments may stem from a more fundamental concern inherent in
the ICC’s institutional nature: the countermajoritarian difficulty.
That is, the ICC’s substantive authority over the citizens of the states
parties independent of these states’ duly elected governments seems
undemocratic. Such facial countermajoritarianism, however, does not
automatically violate U.S. constitutional principles, as the United
States’ own experience with the countermajoritarian difficulty has
shown. In the end analysis, U.S. rejection of the ICC may stem more
pragmatically from entrenched U.S. perspectives on the force of
international law and simple U.S. mistrust of the political motives of
some states parties to the ICC. Rejecting the ICC on these grounds
reciprocally invites scrutiny of the U.S. posture toward the rest of the
world—both through reliance on the principles of international law
and through the use of international law to achieve political
objectives—in civil litigation under the Alien Tort Statute, a longidle provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789.

7. Bill Clinton, Statement by the President, Signature of the International Criminal
Court, in Clinton Announces U.S. Is Signing International Criminal Court Treaty (Dec. 31,
2000), http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/usandun/00123101.htm.
8. Id.
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A. Background: Confronting a Disturbing Asymmetry in U.S. Law
The same “concerns” to which President Clinton alluded in
2000 had already led to vehement objections to the ICC in Senate
hearings on July 23, 1998. Senator Rod Grams declared, “I hope
that now the administration will actively oppose this Court to make
sure that it shares the same fate as the League of Nations and
collapses without U.S. support[,] for this court truly I believe is the
9
monster and it is the monster that we need to slay.” Subsequently,
despite Clinton’s signature on the ICC Statute, the United States
under the Bush Administration abstained from becoming a party to
the treaty just months before the ICC Statute came into effect on
10
July 1, 2002. In fact, concerns over the ICC’s jurisdictional reach,
prosecutorial responsibilities, and the definitions of crimes in the
ICC Statute convinced the Bush Administration to insist on “a 100
percent ironclad guarantee that no American servicemen will be
11
investigated and prosecuted by the court.” On July 13, 2002, after
diplomatically tense weeks of U.S. threats to pull its support from
U.N. peacekeeping missions around the world unless U.S. troops
obtained immunity from prosecution in the ICC, the U.N. Security
Council unanimously passed Resolution 1422 granting the U.S.
12
military immunity for a one-year period. The United States then
began seeking bilateral agreements with individual governments to
13
exempt U.S. military personnel from ICC prosecution.
Additionally, “statements made by U.S. representatives reveal that
9. Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the National Interest?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Int’l Operations of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 4 (1998)
[hereinafter ICC Hearings (1998)] (statement of Sen. Rod Grams).
10. Letter from John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security, to Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General, entitled “International Criminal
Court: Letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan” (May 6, 2002), at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968pf.htm (“This is to inform you, in
connection with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted on July 17,
1998, that the United States does not intend to become a party to the treaty. Accordingly, the
United States has no legal obligations arising from its signature on December 31, 2000.”).
11. Glenn Kessler, Concerns over War Crimes Court Not New, WASH. POST, July 2,
2002, at A9, available at 2002 WL 22785191 (quoting Richard Dicker, director of Human
Rights Watch).
12. S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4572d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1422 (2002); Serge Schmemann, U.S. Peacekeepers Given Year’s Immunity from New
Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2002, at A3; Colum Lynch, U.S. Wins 1-Year Shield from War
Crimes Court, WASH. POST, July 13, 2002, at A16, available at 2002 WL 23853232.
13. Uncle Sam Lays Down the Law, ECONOMIST, Oct. 5, 2002, at 49.
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Resolution 1422 was an obvious step toward thwarting the ICC’s
14
powers,” a step consistent with Senator Grams’s hope that U.S.
rejection of the ICC would send that body the way of the League of
Nations.
But invoking the fate of the League of Nations—although, as
envisioned by Woodrow Wilson, it undoubtedly had its
15
weaknesses —by inviting the demise of the ICC seems dangerous in
today’s world of globalization, and may lead to undesired or
16
unforeseen results. That is, the inability of the western democracies
to cede some sovereignty to the League of Nations after World War
I in the interest of peace created a divisiveness exploited by Hitler in
his quest for domination. This resulted in an unfortunate irony, as
one astute observer noted as early as 1939: “Woodrow Wilson tried
to unite the postwar world in an idealism for which it was not yet
ripe. It would be the height of paradox if Hitler, of all persons, were
destined by his statesmanship finally ‘to make the world safe for
17
Democracy.’” The irrelevancy of the League of Nations taught the
14. Mohamed El Zeidy, The United States Dropped the Atomic Bomb of Article 16 of the
ICC Statute: Security Council Power of Deferrals and Resolution 1422, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1503, 1507 (2002) (arguing for rejection of Resolution 1422 on the grounds
that it contradicts the United Nations Charter and the Law of Treaties and violates certain
preemptory norms).
15. See generally Anthony Whelan, Wilsonian Self-Determination and the Versailles
Settlement, 43 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 99 (1994) (assessing the values and weaknesses of
Wilsonian self-determination and its continued effects and implications in the post–cold war
world).
16. See ROBERT S. MCNAMARA & JAMES G. BLIGHT, WILSON’S GHOST: REDUCING
THE RISK OF CONFLICT, KILLING, AND CATASTROPHE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 59 (2001)
(highlighting current “[p]ublic opinion in the United States and the West [which] dangerously
fails to appreciate the possibility of a Great Power clash and/or to make plans to prevent it”).
Much like Senator Trent Lott’s gaffe at Senator Strom Thurmond’s 100th birthday party, in
which he appeared to condone Thurmond’s segregationist platform as a presidential candidate
in 1948 for the Dixiecrat Party, current citation to the precedent of the American torpedoing
of the League of Nations in justifying rejection of the ICC risks identification with some of the
socially unacceptable and discriminatory reasons that the United States declined joining the
League in 1919. For example, in the debates concerning the Permanent Court of International
Justice under the proposed League of Nations, a senator from Missouri objected to U.S.
participation in the Court or League stating, “‘Think of submitting questions involving the
very life of the United States to a tribunal on which a nigger from Liberia, a nigger from
Honduras, [and] a nigger from India . . . each have votes equal to that of the great United
States.’” David P. Forsythe, The United States and International Criminal Justice, 24 HUM.
RTS. Q. 974, 990 n.47 (2002) (quoting PAUL GORDON LAUREN, POWER AND PREJUDICE:
THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 113 (1988)).
17. C., Will Hitler Save Democracy?, 17 FOREIGN AFF. 455, 464 (April 1939)
(observing that “Hitler’s crudeness . . . has ended by creating . . . what Bismarck always most
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world about the necessity of the post–World War II United Nations
the hard way—through Hitler. And “a future Adolf Hitler may point
to the U.S. action [in not joining the ICC] in telling his followers
18
that they need not fear being held accountable.” But of more
immediate concern, perhaps, than abstractly sending a mixed
message to human rights violators, is that U.S. hopes of impairing
the ICC like the League of Nations create a problematic asymmetry
in the American legal relationship with the rest of the world.
True, legitimate concerns about the ICC Statute led to the U.S.
rejection of the ICC. Certain flaws in the ICC Statute might
19
constitute a threat to U.S. national interests. In general, U.S.
opponents to the ICC believe that the ICC Statute “created a court
with [1] hitherto unprecedented jurisdictional reach and with [2]
substantive authority to adjudicate a long list of crimes previously
20
unknown in the established canon of customary international law.”
These two overarching concerns with the ICC refer, on the one
hand, to the “de facto universal jurisdiction which emerged from the
21
treaty,” and on the other, to the perceived failure of the ICC’s
definitions of crimes “to give adequate notice of exactly what they
22
prohibit under the [U.S.] ‘void for vagueness’ doctrine.” Ironically,
then, in light of the U.S. opposition to the ICC’s universal
jurisdiction and its definitions of crimes, the U.S. Alien Tort Claims
23
Act (ATCA) allows aliens to sue foreign defendants in U.S. courts
for certain crimes committed abroad amounting to violations of
feared: an almost universal anti-German coalition”). Ironically, having rejected the peaceful
way to a union of democratic nations, the world’s democracies were forced to achieve such a
union through the horrors of another world war fought “to defend the principles of freedom
which make individual lives worth living.” Id.
18. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 74 (prepared statement of Michael P. Scharf,
Professor of Law and Director, Center for International Law and Policy, New England School
of Law, Boston, MA) (arguing that “the U.S. may have lost far more than it gained by voting
against the ICC Statute”).
19. Id. at 6 (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms).
20. Richard G. Wilkins, The Right Thing the Wrong Way: Implications of the New
International Criminal Court, WORLD & I, Oct. 2002, at 265, 268.
21. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 15 (statement of Hon. David J. Scheffer,
U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for war crimes issues).
22. Id. at 59 (prepared statement of Hon. John R. Bolton, Former Assistant Secretary of
State for International Organization Affairs; Senior Vice President, American Enterprise
Institute, Washington, D.C.).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). Hailing originally from 1789, the Alien Tort Statute now
reads, “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” Id.
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customary international law—a list of crimes substantially similar to
the three crimes enumerated in the ICC Statute—precisely under the
24
idea of universal jurisdiction. Essentially, as the world’s sole
25
superpower, the United States has created “supercourts” that
employ universal jurisdiction, dubbed federal subject matter
jurisdiction, to judge citizens of countries that have not subjected
26
themselves to U.S. law. This trend has exacerbated a perception of
legal asymmetry from the perspective of other countries:
The juxtaposition of this increased involvement of U.S. courts in
foreign affairs with the continued American refusal to participate in
bodies like the International Criminal Court creates the image of a
country happy to haul foreign defendants into its own courts while
stubbornly resisting even the remote possibility that its own citizens
27
might be called to account [in the ICC].

In short, U.S. courts administer the rule of law against foreign
defendants for these crimes, but the United States does not trust the
28
ICC because judges from places like “Sudan or . . . Iran” may do
the same.
B. Assuaging the Asymmetry
Not only U.S. foreign policy suffers from ATCA litigation;
rather, just as the admitted flaws in the ICC Statute constitute
29
possible constitutional obstacles, ATCA suits raise constitutional
24. Beth Stephens, Expanding Remedies for Human Rights Abuses: Civil Litigation in
Domestic Courts, 40 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 117, 135 (1997) (outlining and applauding U.S.
courts’ application of the ATCA since 1980 as a means of combating human rights abuses).
25. Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiff’s Diplomacy, FOREIGN AFF.,
Sept./Oct. 2000, at 102, 115.
26. Cf. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 7 (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms)
(criticizing the ICC because “this court declared that the American people are under its
jurisdiction no matter what the U.S. government says or does about it”).
27. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 25, at 115.
28. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 3 (statement of Sen. Rod Grams).
29. For a discussion of the constitutional obstacles decried by the United States in the
ICC Statute, see Diane Marie Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, The United States of America and the
International Criminal Court, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 381, 382 (2002) (detailing the various
constitutional concerns surrounding the ICC statute, including “prosecutorial power,
immunity, rights of the accused, fugitive transfer, and imprisonment,” and showing that these
“obstacles . . . may be surmountable, but not without significant political will to ratify”). Even
those countries that support and thus have ratified the ICC face constitutional questions in
conjunction with the operation of the court. See generally Helen Duffy, National
Constitutional Compatibility and the International Criminal Court, 11 DUKE J. COMP. &
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30

concerns of their own. Particularly, the “plaintiff’s diplomacy”
resulting from ATCA litigation infringes on separation of powers
principles, not only between the judicial and executive branches
within the U.S. governmental system, but also, strikingly, between
31
U.S. courts and the legislative prerogatives of other countries. In
this
sense,
ATCA
litigation
actually
compounds
the
32
“countermajoritarian difficulty” already heavily scrutinized in U.S.
INT’L L. 5, 6, 8 (2001). Duffy identifies three overarching constitutional issues in ratifying
countries: (1) “the compatibility of a state’s constitutional prohibition on the extradition of its
nationals with the absolute obligation on state parties to the Rome Statute to arrest and
surrender suspects to the Court”; (2) “the consistency of constitutional immunities, such as
those conferred on heads of states or parliamentarians, with the duty imposed on state parties
to arrest and surrender suspects, irrespective of their official status”; and (3) “the compatibility
of constitutional prohibitions on life imprisonment with the Statute’s provisions on penalties,
which allow the ICC to impose a life sentence in exceptional circumstances.” Id. at 6. Duffy
concludes that ratifying countries have generally divided themselves into two groups over these
questions: those “that have decided to amend their constitutions to ensure that they are in line
with the Rome Statute,” and those that simply “have concluded that their constitutional
provisions are consistent with the Statute, and thus amendment is unnecessary.” Id. at 8.
30. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 25, at 103 (employing the term “plaintiff’s
diplomacy” to describe the “new trend toward [ATCA] lawsuits that shape foreign policy” and
grouping such suits by foreign plaintiffs in United States federal court into three broad
categories: (1) “suits against individuals for grave violations of international law committed in
the name of governments”; (2) “suits against corporations for violations of international law”;
and (3) “suits against foreign governments . . . filed in an effort to achieve justice for victims of
terrorism and oppression”).
31. Suits brought under the ATCA against corporations operating in foreign countries
poignantly exemplify this phenomenon because in addition to “focus[ing] greater attention on
the human rights and environmental implications of corporate investment,” judgments in U.S.
courts in favor of alien plaintiffs “may produce . . . de facto sanctions against states with poor
environmental and human rights records,” id. at 110, which in turn may “overturn” or
“undermine” development policies of “governments of both developing and developed
countries,” id. at 111. Cf. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir.
1999) (expressing that U.S. federal courts should be wary of these suits’ potential for
substituting U.S. policies for the policies of other governments); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142
F. Supp. 2d 534, 552–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (following Beanal in recommending caution in
these cases); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 519–520 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(exercising the caution that the Beanal court suggested in regard to situations where
judgments might have the effect of substituting U.S. policy for the policy of another
government in finding a lack of international consensus in customary international law as a
basis for dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims). See infra Part III.B.3.b for treatment of the effect of
ATCA suits against corporations.
32. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962) (“The root
difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system.”); Barry
Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002) (defining the “countermajoritarian
difficulty” as “the problem of justifying the exercise of judicial review by unelected and
ostensibly unaccountable judges in what we otherwise deem to be a political democracy”).
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constitutional
jurisprudence.
That
is,
ATCA
litigation
internationalizes nonelected federal judges’ countermajoritarianism
by extending it from intrusion into the policymaking responsibilities
of the elected legislature or the executive branch within the United
States to direction of political and social policy in other, usually
developing, countries. But U.S. participation in the ICC—which will
unavoidably also engage in judicial “legislation” on some public
33
policy issues —could assuage the tension in U.S. law between use of
ATCA litigation and opposition to the ICC, a court built on
remarkably similar principles to those underlying modern ATCA
litigation.
This Comment does not aim to give a comprehensive overview
of minutia concerning the ICC. Numerous lengthier studies aptly
34
35
treat the advantages and disadvantages of the ICC Statute. Rather,
this Comment examines the compounded—internationalized—
counter-majoritarian difficulty of ATCA litigation’s “plaintiff’s
diplomacy” in relation to the U.S. rejection of the ICC based in part
on the ICC’s similar capacity for judicial legislation.
First, Part II briefly defines the countermajoritarian difficulty for
use in this framework. Part III spotlights civil litigation under the
ATCA and its more current supplement, the Torture Victim
36
Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA). Although the ATCA amounts to a
37
38
rather “unusual statute” that “lay nearly dormant for 191 years,”

33. Forsythe, supra note 16, at 986 (discussing ICC opponents’ argument that “[s]ince
the ICC will in effect ‘legislate’ on a variety of weighty issues, and since its prosecutor and
judges will have the opportunity to overturn policy established by national democracies, the
court should be opposed”).
34. See, e.g., Joshua Bardavid, The Failure of the State-Centric Model of International
Law and the International Criminal Court, 15 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 9 (2002); Michael P. Scharf,
The United States and the International Criminal Court: The ICC’s Jurisdiction over the
Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter 2001, at 67. An overwhelming number of articles support both sides of the issue,
including, for example, the entire volume of 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2001.
35. See, e.g., Marcus R. Mumford, Building upon a Foundation of Sand: A Commentary
on the International Criminal Court Treaty Conference, 8 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 151 (1999);
Robert Christensen, Getting to Peace by Reconciling Notions of Justice: The Importance of
Considering Discrepancies Between Civil and Common Legal Systems in the Formation of the
International Criminal Court, 6 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 391 (Fall/Winter 2001–
2002).
36. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992)).
37. Stephens, supra note 24, at 122.
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it is nevertheless “one of the most widely discussed provisions in
39
modern international law.” As such, this Comment defers to the
40
previous conscientious studies and criticisms of the U.S. use of the
41
ATCA as a “human rights watchdog,” focusing more narrowly on
the ATCA’s and the TVPA’s implications for the compounded
countermajoritarian difficulty that renders America’s wholesale
rejection of the ICC contradictory.
Part IV investigates the roots of the ICC’s own
42
countermajoritarian difficulty—its “democratic deficit” coupled

38. Ivan Poullaos, Note, The Nature of the Beast: Using the Alien Tort Claims Act to
Combat International Human Rights Violations, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 327 (2002)
(investigating the expansion of ATCA litigation since 1980).
39. William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the
“Originalists,” 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 221 n.2 (1996) (providing a survey
of numerous treatments of the ATCA up to 1996, and arguing that modern ATCA litigation
expresses the original intent behind the statute).
40. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring) (arguing that “[i]t is important to remember that in 1789 there was no
concept of international human rights”); Robert H. Bork, Judicial Imperialism, WALL ST. J.,
June 17, 2003, at A16, available at http://www.aei.org/include/news_print.asp?
newsID=17727 (“[I]t is clear not only that Filartiga [v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980), the leading ATCA case,] is wrong but that it is a serious incursion by courts into the
domain of Congress, involving, as it does, the enactment of world-wide law by an unholy
alliance of imperialistic judges and a leftish cadre of international law professors.”); Jean-Marie
Simon, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Justice or Show Trials?, 11 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1 (1993); Joseph
Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 445 (1995).
41. Cf. Debra A. Harvey, Comment, The Alien Tort Statute: International Human
Rights Watchdog or Simply Historical Trivia?, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 341, 341 (1988)
(showing how the unclear origins of the ICC Statute in 1789 lead to uncertainty of the
ATCA’s scope).
42. Forsythe, supra note 16, at 986 (examining the “democratic deficit” of the ICC as a
budding U.S. concern). Many international institutions face the criticism that a perceived
democratic deficit inherent in their supra-national nature renders them illegitimate. See, e.g.,
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Globalization’s Democratic Deficit, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2001, at 2,
4–5. Nye argues that “governments can do several things to respond to the concerns about a
global democratic deficit. First, they can try to design international institutions that preserve as
much space as possible for domestic political processes to operate.” Id. at 4. Second,
“[g]overnments should also make clear that democratic accountability can be quite indirect.
Accountability is often assured through means other than voting, even in well-functioning
democracies.” Id. at 5. Finally, “[i]ncreased transparency is also essential. . . . In some
instances, such as judicial procedures or market interventions, it is unrealistic to provide
information in advance, but records and justifications of decisions can later be disclosed for
comment and criticism—as the Federal Reserve and the Supreme Court do in domestic
politics.” Id. The European Union displays a marked example of a democratic deficit in
international institutions. See, e.g., L. NEVILLE BROWN & TOM KENNEDY, THE COURT OF
JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 3 (4th ed. 1994) (“[The Maastricht Treaty]
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with its capacity for judicial legislation—through structural and
prudential arguments arising out of the ICC’s institutional nature
and its reliance on universal jurisdiction in administering justice. The
ICC’s institutional newness entails risks, including the possibility of
ceding some sovereignty to participate in the court, but “a state may
43
consent to limitations on its sovereignty”; indeed, the United States
44
has excelled in “split[ting] the atom of sovereignty.” Moreover,
current U.S. use of legal principles such as universal jurisdiction and
the substance of customary international law as a basis for the
expansion of ATCA litigation and as a justification for enacting the
TVPA lessens the validity of these issues as prohibitive constitutional
risks of participation in the ICC. Instead, the truly difficult
constitutional concern arising out of the ICC relates to the
countermajoritarian difficulty: the institutional nature of the ICC will
allow it to pass judgment on, and so in a certain sense to direct,
domestic public policy relating to the three crimes under its
jurisdiction.
Finally, Part V notes that with some effort, U.S. ratification of
the Statute could provide a (constitutional) solution, allowing the
United States to continue using the ATCA in civil suits without
eliciting the disdain of a world all too eager to mistakenly equate
45
U.S. hegemony with empire building. Rather than subjecting the
world to a de facto universal law in the form of U.S. federal subject
matter jurisdiction to the exclusion of the ICC, a participatory
international panel, U.S. ATCA litigation could simply provide civil
remedies for criminal offenses authoritatively tried in the ICC. But
Part V concludes that because the United States “remains mired in
enhances the powers of the European Parliament to help meet the so-called ‘democratic
deficit’ within the Community.”).
43. Amann & Sellers, supra note 29, at 401 (citing John Marshall’s opinion in Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (noting that states can consent to
limit their sovereignty)).
44. United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
45. On views of America as a type of neo–Roman Empire, see G. John Ikenberry,
America’s Imperial Ambition, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2002, at 44; Allister Sparks et al.,
How the World Views America, WILSON Q., Spring 2001, at 46 (a collection of seven articles
by seven authors from around the world addressing this question and finding largely that
America deserves the designation of empire). For an explanation of why accusations of
American empire building are misguided, see Martin Walker et al., An American Empire?,
WILSON Q., Summer 2002, at 35 (essays by five scholars refuting the comparison between
America and Rome and exposing the fallacy in identifying America with other past empires).
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history, exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world where
46
international laws and rules are unreliable,” the ICC’s capacity for
judicial legislation will continue to dissuade the United States from
joining the ICC, at least until the ICC establishes itself.
II. THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY IN THE U.S.
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
A. From Judicial Review to the “Countermajoritarian Difficulty”
47

Ever since Marbury v. Madison the concept of judicial review
has thrived in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence. But the fact that
unelected judges can override legislation created by elected
representatives of the people seems undemocratic, even
antidemocratic; in short, as Alexander Bickel notes, “judicial review
48
is a counter-majoritarian force in our system.” However, Alexander
Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78 “denied . . . that judicial review
constituted control by an unrepresentative minority of an elected
49
majority.” This conclusion “only supposes that the power of the
people is superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature
declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people
declared in the constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the
50
latter, rather than the former.” But even the highly valued stability
51
that this ensures is “a countermajoritarian factor” because in
upholding the Constitution against an inconsistent current legislative
enactment “it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people
of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the

46. ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW
WORLD ORDER 3 (2003). President George W. Bush confirmed this feeling following the
deadlock among the permanent members of the Security Council over how best to disarm Iraq
in the months preceding the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 in his verdict that “[t]he
United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours.”
President George W. Bush, Speech Delivering Ultimatum to Iraq (Mar. 17, 2003),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/ 2003/03/17/iraq/main544377.shtml (issuing a 48-hour
ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his sons to leave Iraq or face “military conflict commenced
at a time of our choosing”).
47. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
48. BICKEL, supra note 32, at 16.
49. Id.
50. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 395–96 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Willis ed., 1982).
51. BICKEL, supra note 32, at 17.

1139

FOW-FIN

9/29/2003 10:30 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2003

52

prevailing majority, but against it.” In short, the power of
appointed justices not directly accountable to the voting public—
such as those on the U.S. Supreme Court—over the elected
legislature through judicial review renders the resulting de facto
creation of political and social policy undemocratic.
And yet the United States is also wary of a politicized judiciary.
“We disdain the notion of judges rendering decisions under the
53
threat of political retribution,” which threat can arise in the case of
elected judges. Similarly, in the case of appointed judges, “[w]e
expect that judges will decide cases based on the facts and existing
54
precedents, rather than on the preferences of those in power.”
These two concerns express America’s priority on the rule of law free
from politics, perhaps even over the criticism that appointed justices
are an unelected minority with power over the elected representatives
of the majority. To divorce politics from federal adjudication, the
Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, in part through
55
life tenure. A sufficiently independent judiciary allows courts to
decide according to reasoned principle, a role they are institutionally
uniquely suited to perform. “When we speak of the rule of law—at
home and abroad—this [adjudication free from political pressure] is
56
in large part what we mean.” Allowing an independent judiciary to
administer the rule of law in a system of horizontal separation of
powers provides an essential check on legislative and executive
power; judicial review facilitates the judiciary’s designated role in the
U.S. system of checks and balances.

52. Id.
53. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part IV: Law’s
Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 972 (2000).
54. Id.
55. Id. (“Article III’s tenure and salary guarantees for federal judges are the
constitutional embodiment of this value of judicial independence from political pressure.”).
But others have argued the opposite: that the lifetime tenure of federal judges can compromise
the independent judiciary. See, e.g, L.A. Powe, Jr., Old People and Good Behavior, in
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 77–79 (William Eskridge &
Sanford Levinson eds., 1998) (arguing that a solution to the way that lifetime tenure detracts
from the independence of the judiciary “is a non-renewable eighteen-year term . . . with
vacancies occurring every two years” because “[t]he turnover would remain roughly the
previous average (2.2 years) but would be less random”).
56. Friedman, supra note 53, at 972–73.
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B. “[N]either Force nor Will, but [M]erely [J]udgment”

Because each branch of the U.S. government represents the
interest of the people, the countermajoritarian nature of the federal
judiciary in providing an essential check on the other branches must
not necessarily constitute a difficulty for the U.S. democratic system.
True, “judicial review is a deviant institution in the American
58
democracy” when compared to the actions of legislators and the
executive whom the people elect directly, but that does not
necessarily detract from the republican nature of American
59
democracy or implicate a “crisis of legitimacy” for judicial review.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the independent judiciary could
fulfill its constitutional role as “an intermediate body between the
people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the
60
latter within the limits assigned to their authority” without Justice
Marshall’s ingenious solution to the deadlock in Marbury v.
Madison: formalized judicial review.
Furthermore, the fact that the people do not directly elect federal
judges does not automatically de-legitimize judicial review; rather, it
amounts to a gradation of representation, resulting from elected
officials’ constitutionally prescribed powers of appointment. The
United States never was a “pure Democracy . . . consisting of a small
number of citizens, who assemble and administer the Government in
person,” because such a government “can admit of no cure for the
61
mischiefs of faction.” Rather, the republican U.S. system rejects the
Greek model of democracy by providing for “the total exclusion of the
people in their collective capacity from any share in the [American

57. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 394 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Willis ed., 1982).
58. BICKEL, supra note 32, at 18.
59. Barry Friedman, Diagolue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 579 (1993).
Friedman argues that legal scholarship following Bickel concerning judicial review and the
countermajoritarian difficulty “rests upon a descriptively inaccurate foundation.” Id. at 580.
He suggests that in reality federal courts “do not trump majority will, or remain unaccountable
to majority sentiment, nearly to the extent usually depicted. Measured by a realistic baseline of
majoritarianism, courts are relatively majoritarian,” id. at 586, on the basis that (1) “courts
frequently draw upon evidence of majoritarian will in reaching decisions,” and (2) an
examination of “whether the selection and accountability of judges somehow differs so
significantly from that of other governmental officials as to account for the countermajoritarian
label affixed to courts,” shows that the American system indeed places “accountability
constraints on the judiciary,” id. at 590.
60. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 395 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Willis ed., 1982).
61. Id. NO. 10, at 46 (James Madison).
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Governments].” In truth, the Constitution removes federal judges
one more step from the people than it did even the pre–Seventeenth
Amendment Senate—whose senators were elected by the state
legislatures from among themselves, and not directly by the people—
that Madison describes in The Federalist No. 63. Nevertheless,
presidential appointment of federal judges coupled with their
63
ratification by the “Advice and Consent of the Senate” still effects
64
Madison’s “policy” of “successive filtrations” meant to place the
most qualified and virtuous people into such offices. Thus, the
republican nature of American democracy and the policy of
successive filtration recast the admitted countermajoritarianism of
judicial review as an integral part of the U.S. constitutional system of
representative democracy, rather than as deviant to it.
But twentieth-century scholarship has largely stigmatized judicial
review. Particularly since Bickel’s 1962 description of the
countermajoritarian difficulty, judicial review has carried with it a
65
presumption of illegitimacy. Concerns about judicial review often
stem from a natural side effect of the use of judicial review to strike
down a statute passed by the legislature on the grounds of
unconstitutionality: the impact of such a decision on political or
social policy may constitute judicial legislation. Moreover, a judge or
court may consciously pursue a course of judicial activism intended
to create public policy favorable to a particular ideology. Indeed,
political ideology plays a large role in how one perceives the exercise
of judicial review. A liberal will decry the Rehnquist Court for
judicial activism; a conservative will reply that the Rehnquist Court is
merely reining legislative power back into its constitutional scope,
accusing the Warren and Burger Courts of unacceptable
implementation of judicial review amounting to judicial legislation.
Either way, a perception of countermajoritarianism inheres in the
62. Id. NO. 63, at 322 (James Madison).
63. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
64. 1 JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 81 (E.H. Scott ed.,
Chicago, Albert, Scott & Co. 1893) (1840).
65. See Friedman, supra note 59, at 578 (“At least since Alexander Bickel’s The Least
Dangerous Branch, constitutional scholars have been preoccupied, indeed one might say
obsessed, by the perceived necessity of legitimizing judicial review.”); Bruce A. Ackerman, The
Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1016 (1984) (quoted in
Friedman, supra note 59, at 578 n.3) (“Hardly a year goes by without some learned professor
announcing that he has discovered the final solution to the countermajoritarian difficulty, or,
even more darkly, that the countermajoritarian difficulty is insoluble.”).

1142

FOW-FIN

1129]

9/29/2003 10:30 PM

Compounding the Countermajoritarian Difficulty

nature of the federal judiciary, implicating a “difficulty” in federal
judges’ capacity for judicial legislation.
Concerns about the countermajoritarian difficulty apply not only
to the judicial review exercised by the Supreme Court in
constitutional decisions, but also more broadly to decisions of the
lower federal courts, and even to the role of courts in general. Lower
federal judges face the countermajoritarian difficulty for the same
reasons as the Supreme Court: they are unelected, and so when they
engage in judicial legislation through the creation of public policy
that either naturally or intentionally accompanies their decisions,
their actions seem undemocratic. The role of federal judges in ATCA
litigation provides a strident example of this effect. The Constitution
reserves to the executive branch the prerogative of conducting
66
foreign policy. But through their decisions on cases brought under
the ATCA, federal judges intrude into the executive’s sphere,
facilitating “plaintiff’s diplomacy” by allowing alien victims to sue
despots for certain violations of customary international law
67
committed in a foreign country. Compounding this applied
countermajoritarianism, ATCA litigation allows federal judges to
preempt the policymaking role of foreign legislatures by participating
68
in the creation of political or social policy in those countries. Part
III explores both “plaintiff’s diplomacy” and judicial legislation
resulting from federal judges’ (countermajoritarian) decisions under
the ATCA.
Other courts engage in judicial legislation through their
decisions as well; indeed, a court can hardly avoid doing so if the
natural consequences of its decisions have the effect of creating
policy. Some courts engage in judicial legislation more consciously
than others. For example, the Supreme Court of India maintains a
69
decidedly activist reputation. Similarly, the European Court of
66. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see also H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT’S
AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS 152 (2002) (providing a “taxonomy” for “the general
principle that the Constitution vests the president with the authority to formulate and
implement the foreign policy of the United States”).
67. See infra Part III.B.1 for a discussion of the Falun Gong cases which exhibit
“plaintiff’s diplomacy” in action as a tool for attempting to achieve human rights reform in
China through accountability.
68. See infra Part III.B.3.b for an examination of federal courts’ capacity to preempt
legislative policymaking in foreign countries through ATCA litigation.
69. See Carl Baar, Social Action Litigation in India: The Operation and Limits of the
World’s Most Active Judiciary, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW & PUBLIC POLICY 77
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Justice has pursued an agenda of judicial activism with regard to
70
Community Law. Generally speaking, judicial activism is on the rise
71
in a global “judicialization of politics,” in which judicial activism
means “the transfer of decision-making rights from the legislature,
72
the cabinet, or the civil service to the courts.” Not surprisingly,
judicial legislation—the judicial creation of public policy, whether
through explicit judicial activism or not—will also surface in the
decisions of the ICC. Considering U.S. preoccupation with
“legitimizing” the domestic countermajoritarian difficulty, the ICC’s
own structural “democratic deficit” coupled with its potential for
judicial legislation, arguably a countermajoritarian difficulty on an
73
international scale, is a constitutional concern for the United States.
Part IV addresses the countermajoritarian difficulty in terms of the
ICC. Interestingly, the ICC’s potential for judicial legislation on
certain policy issues seems to worry the United States more than the
possibility that U.S. federal judges might create public policy in
foreign countries through ATCA litigation.

(Donald W. Jackson & C. Neal Tate eds., 1992); Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public
Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible?, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 495 (1989).
70. Christoph Henkel, Constitutionalism of the European Union: Judicial Legislation
and Political Decision-Making by the European Court of Justice, 19 WIS. INT’L L.J. 153, 154
(2001) (noting that “the expansion of judicial review by the European Court of Justice
remains the driving force behind the development of constitutionalism of the European
Union,” and positing that “the case law of the Court of Justice in part reflects the judicial
activism comparable to early U.S. Supreme Court assertions of federal power”); Mark C.
Miller, A Comparison of Two Evolving Courts: The Canadian Supreme Court and the European
Court of Justice, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 27, 58 (1999) (concluding that “[t]he
European Court of Justice has been much less hesitant to use judicial activism” than the
Canadian Supreme Court in its “quasi-federal polity”); Jürgen Schwarze, Judicial Review in
EC Law—Some Reflections on the Origins and the Actual Legal Situation, 51 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 17 (2002) (identifying problems with judicial review exercised by the European Court of
Justice and focusing on the relationship between the European Court of Justice and the
German Bundesgerichtshof). But see David J. Gerber, The Transformation of European
Community Competition Law?, 35 HARV. INT’L L. J. 97, 130 (1994) (observing that the
European Court of Justice is becoming less activist).
71. C. Neal Tate & Torbjörn Vallinder, The Global Expansion of Judicial Power: The
Judicialization of Politics, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 2 (C. Neal Tate &
Torbjörn Vallinder eds., 1995) (designating the United States as the “home of the
judicialization of politics”).
72. Torbjörn Vallinder, When the Courts Go Marching In, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION
OF JUDICIAL POWER 13 (C. Neal Tate & Torbjörn Vallinder eds., 1995).
73. See infra Parts IV.B.1–2 for a treatment of structural and prudential arguments
arising from the ICC’s “democratic deficit.”
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III. THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY IN ATCA
LITIGATION
ATCA litigation incorporates the countermajoritarian difficulty
as nonelected federal judges both participate in foreign policy—
constituting an encroachment by the nonelected judiciary on the
responsibilities of the elected President—and create public policy in
foreign countries, a job that elected legislatures in those countries are
best suited to perform. Of course, despite criticisms of the
countermajoritarian difficulty in the U.S. judiciary, it has “long been
an integral part of our system of government,” and is “both firmly
74
entrenched and fully accepted.” So an expression of it arising out of
civil litigation under the ATCA conducted in U.S. federal courts
might not be very distressing, even if it were on an international
scale. But the United States strongly opposes the ICC partly on the
basis that it may engage in judicial legislation, preempting
Congress’s policymaking role in the United States. Remarkably,
though, U.S. ATCA litigation relies on a legal framework that closely
resembles the rejected premises underlying the ICC: universal
jurisdiction and a substantially similar list of crimes to which
universal jurisdiction attaches in both the ATCA and the ICC. This
Part gives a broad overview of ATCA litigation, surveying the U.S.
expansion of universal jurisdiction—which the United States denies
exists in the context of the ICC—to cover violations of evolving
customary international law under its auspices.
A. Universal Jurisdiction and Customary International Law in the
ATCA
At first, the concept that an alien can sue another alien in U.S.
federal court for an offense committed in a foreign country seems,
frankly, alien. In fact, the ATCA permits only aliens to sue, and not
75
U.S. citizens, a situation that Congress remedied in attaching the
76
TVPA to the ATCA in 1991. But the principle of universal
jurisdiction clarifies how the United States could possibly claim

74. Friedman, supra note 59, at 578.
75. Stephens, supra note 24, at 125.
76. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86
(“While the Alien Tort Claims Act provides a remedy to aliens only, the TVPA would extend a
civil remedy also to U.S. citizens who may have been tortured abroad.”).
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jurisdiction in a case between two aliens for a crime committed
abroad.
Universal jurisdiction is an instrument of international justice
that reaches violators of certain customary international laws or jus
78
cogens norms regardless of where they may be. “Under the principle
of universal jurisdiction a state is entitled or even required to bring
proceedings in respect of certain serious crimes, irrespective of the
location of the crime, and irrespective of the nationality of the
79
perpetrator or the victim.” The concept of universal jurisdiction
implies some consensus on what crimes should trigger it: “[b]y
qualifying certain crimes as being subject to universal jurisdiction the
international community signals that they are so appalling that they
80
represent a threat to the international legal order.” Under the
precursor to international law, the “law of nations” provided a
“system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and established by
universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the world,” and
which “must necessarily result from those principles of natural
81
justice, in which all the learned of every nation agree.” An early
example of an offender subject to this type of jurisdiction was the
pirate, who was seen as hostis humani generis, or an enemy of all
mankind, by virtue of having “renounced all the benefits of society

77. Once it is clear that universal jurisdiction attaches to a certain offense, then serving
process on a potential defendant while physically present in the territory of the United States,
no matter how temporarily, provides the requisite personal jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant. This is called “transient jurisdiction” or “tag jurisdiction.” Thomas E.
Vanderbloemen, Note, Assessing the Potential Impact of the Proposed Hague Jurisdiction and
Judgments Convention on Human Rights Litigation in the United States, 50 DUKE L.J. 917,
928 (2000).
78. “Peremptory norms.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §
102 cmt. k (1987). The RESTATEMENT defines “peremptory norms” as
rules of international law [which] are recognized by the international community of
states as peremptory, permitting no derogation. These rules prevail over and
invalidate international agreements and other rules of international law in conflict
with them. Such a peremptory norm is subject to modification only by a subsequent
norm of international law having the same character. It is generally accepted that the
principles of the United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of force . . . have the
character of jus cogens.
Id.
79. Menno T. Kamminga, Lessons Learned from the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in
Respect of Gross Human Rights Offenses, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 940, 941–42 (2001).
80. Id. at 943.
81. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *66–67.
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and government, and ha[ving] reduced himself afresh to the savage
82
state of nature, by declaring war against all mankind.”
This concept has lived on and been elaborated upon in the
notion of predicating universal jurisdiction on certain egregious
violations of modern customary international law. International law
is constantly evolving as practices “ripen” into legal norms over
83
time; however, Blackstone’s notion of the necessity that a nation
first consent before it can be bound by international law has survived
as well in the notion of opinio juris, which means the point at which
84
a country feels obligated to integrate a custom as law. The United
States recognizes the concept of customary international law as an
evolving body of law: in order to ascertain what the “law of
nations”—or in modern parlance, international law—is, U.S. courts
look to “the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by
the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions
85
recognising and enforcing that law.” And over one hundred years
ago, the Supreme Court declared that “[i]nternational law is part of
our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of

82. Id. at *71.
83. Poullaos, supra note 38, at 332.
84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. c (1987).
The RESTATEMENT describes how opinio juris functions:
For a practice of states to become a rule of customary international law it must
appear that the states follow the practice from a sense of legal obligation (opinio
juris sive necessitatis); a practice that is generally followed but which states feel
legally free to disregard does not contribute to customary law. A practice initially
followed by states as a matter of courtesy or habit may become law when states
generally come to believe that they are under a legal obligation to comply with it. It
is often difficult to determine when that transformation into law has taken place.
Explicit evidence of a sense of legal obligation (e.g., by official statements) is not
necessary; opinio juris may be inferred from acts or omissions.
Id.
85. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160–61 (1820) (referring to the
definition of piracy as found in the law of nations, “which is part of the common law,” in
upholding the death sentence for a convicted pirate). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
found established international custom authoritative as a valid description of international law:
[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as
evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor,
research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the
subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for
the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).

1147

FOW-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/29/2003 10:30 PM

[2003

justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
86
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”
Therefore, once a custom has evolved into customary international
law as evidenced by treaties, scholarly works, and judicial decisions,
etc., then it is also U.S. law, provided there is opinio juris.
Universal jurisdiction then attaches to certain violations of this
evolved customary international law. Viewed conservatively, “[i]n
customary international law, these crimes are piracy, the slave trade,
and traffic in children and women. . . . The application of universal
jurisdiction is also widely recognized for genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes, that is, for the core crimes of the Rome
87
Statute.” The law can develop further still into jus cogens norms—or
peremptory norms of international law that are “accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
88
having the same character.” In this sense, jus cogens norms
89
constitute the highest level of international law. Conceivably then,
universal jurisdiction entailed in violations of jus cogens maintains a
greater degree of certain validity than even universal jurisdiction
90
inherent in certain grave breaches of customary international law,
which requires the consent of states to be binding.

86. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
87. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 60 (2001). Furthermore, “[m]ore recently, some multilateral treaties have also
recognized universal jurisdiction for particular offenses such as hijacking and other threats to
air travel, piracy, attacks upon diplomats, nuclear safety, terrorism, apartheid, and torture.” Id.
88. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S.
332.
89. Marc Rosen, Note, The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act: A Policy Solution, 6 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 461, 486 n.169 (1998) (“[T]here is
no consensus among commentators as to how a norm precisely attains jus cogens status or
what the consequences are if one does.”).
90. But see Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In
Princz, a Holocaust survivor sued the Federal Republic of Germany directly for damages
attendant to injuries inflicted on him at, and to slave labor performed in, a concentration
camp. The survivor argued that “[a] foreign state that violates these fundamental requirements
of a civilized world [i.e., jus cogens norms] thereby waives its right to be treated as a
sovereign,” id. at 1173, meaning that Nazi Germany’s violation of jus cogens norms in
perpetrating the Holocaust constituted an implied waiver of its sovereign immunity as a state,
id. at 1176. But writing for the court, Judge Ruth Ginsburg rejected this argument, holding
that despite Nazi Germany’s atrocious violations of jus cogens norms, the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act required that a foreign government signal its submission to the jurisdiction of
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B. The Expansion of Universal Jurisdiction
Through “Plaintiff’s Diplomacy”

The reach of the ATCA has extended significantly since its
91
inclusion in the Judiciary Act of 1789 as the Alien Tort Statute.
92
What originally seems to have filled a conspicuous gap in U.S. law
by allowing foreign nationals to recover damages while in the United
States, facilitating a respectable U.S. entrance into the community of
93
nations, now “empower[s] the United States judiciary to bring to
justice autocratic leaders who have little or no concern for human
94
rights.” Essentially, alien plaintiffs can now use the ATCA to
achieve human rights reforms in other countries by forcing
accountability for human rights abuses through U.S. courts, even—
and usually—absent the alien defendants’ consent to U.S.
jurisdiction. “Plaintiff’s diplomacy” currently thrives in federal
courts.
1. A case study of “plaintiff’s diplomacy” in action: the Falun Gong
experience
On October 23, 2002, during a brief visit to Chicago, Chinese
President Jiang Zemin was served process for a class-action lawsuit
charging him “with orchestrating a campaign of torture and murder
95
against countless Falungong [sic] practitioners in China.” Since

the country in which the suit is filed, which the government of Nazi Germany had not done.
Id. at 1174. But cf. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 25, at 107–08 (discussing successful
Holocaust recovery cases in the late 1990s in which the plaintiffs successfully sued corporations
that contributed to or benefited from the atrocities, rather than the state directly).
91. The original language of the Alien Tort Statute read: “That the district courts shall
have . . . cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as
the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.” Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (1789).
Compare supra note 23 for the modern reading of the ATCA, in which “original jurisdiction”
replaces “cognizance” and “any civil action” replaces “all causes.”
92. See generally Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 114 (1784)
(having to resort to the criminal common law of Pennsylvania, which incorporated the “law of
nations,” in order to grant French plaintiff, an injured French diplomat to the United States,
relief from defendant, a French citizen, for an assault that occurred in the United States).
93. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (observing that the United
States must be in a position to fulfill its legal obligations vis-à-vis other nations).
94. Poullaos, supra note 38, at 356.
95. Falungong Sues Jiang for Damages for Rights Abuses in U.S. Court, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 24, 2002, 2002 WL 23632580 [hereinafter Falungong Sues Jiang].
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1999, the Chinese government has cracked down brutally on
97
adherents of the Falun Gong, which the Chinese government
98
characterizes as an “evil cult and a threat to society.” In response to
the systematic abuse of their human rights, Falun Gong practitioners
have turned to, among other things, the ATCA both for a remedy
and in an attempt at prevention. Actually, attorneys for the Falun
Gong have indicated that these lawsuits aim more at prevention than
at monetary satisfaction: “this lawsuit is not about money, it’s about
99
The Center for Justice and
stopping the persecution.”
100
Accountability is handling another pending case for the Falun
101
Gong, Doe v. Liu Qi (as well as cases for other victims), with

96. See Kelly A. Thomas, Falun Gong: An Analysis of China’s National Security
Concerns, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 471, 472 (2001) (“The government-sponsored attack on
Falun Gong has been marked by arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture, custodial deaths,
show trials resulting in lengthy prison sentences, and government-imposed psychiatric
commitments.”).
97. Erin Chlopak describes Falun Gong or Falun Dafa as
an ancient Chinese meditation practice, or gigong, which seeks to nurture the mind
and body through the mixture of Buddhist beliefs, slow movements, and martial-arttype exercises, while emphasizing the fundamental principles of “truth, benevolence,
and forbearance.” Literally, “Falun Gong” means “Cultivation of the Wheel of
Law,” while “Falun Dafa” translates to “Great Wheel of Buddha’s Law.”
Erin Chlopak, China’s Crackdown on Falun Gong, 9 NO. 1 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 17, 17 (2001);
see also Falun Dafa website at http://www.clearwisdom.net (last visited May 1, 2003).
98. John Pomfret & Philip P. Pan, Torture Is Breaking Falun Gong; China Systematically
Eradicating Group, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2001, at A01 (“But the underlying reason for the
crackdown is the [Chinese] leadership’s view that Falun Gong is an independent organization
that threatens the Communist Party’s monopoly on power.”); see also Chen Huanzhong, A
Brief Overview of Law and Religion in the People’s Republic of China, 2003 BYU L. REV. 465,
473 (“Few governments would likely tolerate a confrontational force like the one presented by
the Falun Gong, regardless of its depiction as a religion.”).
99. Falungong Sues Jiang, supra note 95 (quoting Terri A. Marsh, attorney for the
Falun Gong).
100. See
Center
for
Justice
and
Accountability
(“CJA”)
website,
http://www.cja.org/cases/ cases.shtml (last visited March 15, 2003) [hereinafter CJA
website] (“CJA brings civil lawsuits in U.S. courts against human rights violators who live, visit
or keep assets in the U.S. . . . The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) forms the principal [sic] legal
basis of suits brought by the CJA.”).
101. Civil No. C 02-0672 CW (EMC) (N.D. Cal.) (case pending) (alleging that Liu, the
Mayor of Beijing, knew or should have known about the human rights abuses perpetrated
against Falun Gong practitioners in Beijing and that he violated a duty under both Chinese
and international law by not preventing the abuses); Plaintiff A. v. Xia Deren, Civil No. 020695 CW (EMC) (N.D. Cal.) (case pending) (bringing a complaint against a defendant acting
in his official capacity as a member of the Chinese government). See the CJA website for
regularly published updates on the progress of these two pending Falun Gong cases that have
been consolidated.
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precisely this goal, as are numerous other public interest groups
interested in effecting changes in foreign governments whose policies
violate human rights. In other words, private plaintiffs are entering
the diplomatic ring through the U.S. courts.
For the Falun Gong, this approach has already obtained results—
though perhaps not exactly what the Falun Gong had in mind. In
102
Peng Liang, a Chinese plaintiff,
Peng Liang v. Zhao Zhifei,
entrusted Falun Gong contacts in America to bring a $50 million
wrongful death lawsuit under the ATCA and the TVPA on his behalf
against Zhao Zhifei, Head of Public Security for the Hubei Province
103
in China. Police in Hubei under Zhao’s command had tortured
Peng’s mother and brother to death. Zhao was served process while
104
on a visit to New York City. Rather than appearing in New York
City for trial, Zhao allegedly returned to China and promptly
arrested Peng on August 30, 2001, after which Peng disappeared
105
until January 2002. Additionally, Zhao’s security police “arrested
106
and cruelly tortured” Falun Gong practitioners who were thought
to be associated with Peng. Because Zhao did not appear in court to
defend himself against the charges, the court entered a default
judgment against him. Attorneys for the Falun Gong hailed the
outcome as a victory because “[t]oday, the Chinese Government’s
persecution of Falun Dafa in violation of international law has been
acknowledged in the United States District Court. The defendant
107
cannot deny this judgment.” Due to the extreme difficulties in

102. No. 01 Civil 6535 (DLC) (S.D.N.Y. default judgment entered Dec. 21, 2001),
reported in Falun Dafa Information Center, Judgment Against High-Ranking Chinese Official
Handed Down by U.S. Court, FRIENDS OF FALUN GONG, USA, Dec. 23, 2001, at
http://www.fofg.org/news/news_story.php?doc_id=233 (last visited Mar. 15, 2003)
[hereinafter Judgment Against High-Ranking Chinese Official].
103. See Falun Dafa Information Center, Plaintiff in Lawsuit Against High-Ranking
Chinese Official Arrested; Denied All Contact with Outside World, FRIENDS OF FALUN GONG,
USA, Jan. 13, 2002, at http://www.fofg.org/news/plaintiff_arrested.html (last visited Mar.
15, 2003) [hereinafter Plaintiff in Lawsuit].
104. Sect Sues Chinese Official in New York, N.Y. POST, July 19, 2001, at 21, available at
2001 WL 23409485.
105. Plaintiff in Lawsuit, supra note 103.
106. Falun Dafa Information Center, US Lawsuit Against Official Zhao Zhifei Results in
Massive Arrests and Torture of Falun Gong Practitioners in China’s Hubei Province, FALUN
DAFA CLEARWISDOM.NET, Oct. 13, 2001, at http://clearwisdom.net/emh/articles/
2001/10/16/14733p.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
107. Judgment Against High-Ranking Chinese Official, supra note 102 (quoting
plaintiff’s co-counsel, Terri A. Marsh).
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trying to collect on massive damage awards in these ATCA suits,
such victories are largely symbolic; but those who bring these suits
109
also hope for a deterrent effect, since U.S. courts can attach
defendants’ U.S. assets in satisfaction.
2. The evolution of ATCA litigation as the tool of “plaintiff’s
diplomacy”
Under current application of the ATCA, human rights groups
110
can seek out past victims who will make likely plaintiffs in cases
that these groups hope will impact the policies of regimes that abuse
human rights. Since 1980, the list of such cases has grown longer
year by year. How did the ATCA transform into a judicial
instrument of such positive action in approaching human rights
abuses? The answer surfaces in the dynamic nature of customary
international law, which has replaced the appellation “law of
nations,” a violation of which triggers liability under the ATCA. U.S.
courts have not shied away from (re)interpreting the “law of
111
nations” for use in U.S. courts, and the very nature of the sources
listed in United States v. Smith and endorsed in The Paquete Habana
from which to deduce the current state of customary international
law implies that it is dynamic, or in other words, evolving.
The Second Circuit looked precisely to such sources—and
expressly to the precedent of The Paquete Habana—in a thorough
survey of customary international law as it has evolved over time in
order to find against the defendant in the seminal ATCA case of

108. See Edward A. Amley, Jr., Note, Sue and Be Recognized: Collecting § 1350
Judgments Abroad, 107 YALE L.J. 2177 (1998) (discussing situations in which collection of
these judgments might be easier and suggesting how to approach ATCA and TVPA suits so
that foreign judiciaries and states will recognize them).
109. But see Letter from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Advisor, Department of State, to
Honorable Robert D. McCallum, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, United States
Department of Justice, “Re: Doe, et al. v. Liu Qi, et al., and Plaintiff A, et al. v. Xia Deren,
Civil Nos. C 02–0672 CW (EMC) and C 02–0695 CW (EMC) (N.D. Cal.)” (Sept. 25,
2002), http://www.cja.org/ChinaStateDept.pdf (last visited May 1, 2003) [hereinafter Taft
Letter] (“In our judgment, adjudication of these multiple [Falun Gong] lawsuits [under the
ATCA and the TVPA], including the cases before Magistrate Chen, is not the best way for the
United States to advance the cause of human rights in China.”).
110. See CJA website, supra note 100 (“CJA works with survivor communities, human
rights organizations, and torture treatment centers throughout the United States to help
torture survivors seek legal remedies for their injuries.”).
111. See supra Part III.A and text accompanying notes 84–86.
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Filartiga v. Peña-Irala. Through this case, the court resurrected
ATCA litigation and put it in the position to act as a tool against
human rights abuses. In Filartiga, the Paraguayan father and sister
of a man tortured and killed in Paraguay brought suit against the
perpetrator—the former Paraguayan Inspector General of Police—in
U.S. court. The court found that because the defendant was acting
under color of state law at the time, he was capable of violating
113
international law. In order to ascertain exactly what the “law of
nations” or international law was that the defendant had allegedly
violated, the court looked to the exact types of sources listed in
United States v. Smith and in the Statute of the International Court
of Justice, Articles 38 and 59, to find what constituted ripened
114
customary international law. For the court in Filartiga, these
sources included United Nations General Assembly Resolutions and
115
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as one of the “basic
116
principles of international law,” other international conventions,
117
covenants, and treaties,
the Eighth Amendment to the U.S.
118
Constitution, and even to articles from the Harvard International
Law Journal and the International and Comparative Law
119
Quarterly. On the basis of these authorities, which The Paquete
Habana certified as “trustworthy evidence of what the [customary
120
international] law really is,” the court in Filartiga found that the
Paraguayan defendant could be liable in a U.S. court for his crimes
of torture and murder committed against Paraguayan citizens in
Paraguay because “the torturer has become like the pirate and slave
trader before him––hostis humani generis, an enemy of all
121
mankind.” In other words, universal jurisdiction has now attached
to the torturer when acting under color of state law, just as it had
attached to the pirate of the eighteenth century, whom Blackstone

112. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
113. Id. at 884–85.
114. Id. at 880–81 & n.8; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §
102 (1987).
115. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882–84.
116. Id. at 882.
117. Id. at 884.
118. Id. at 884 n.13.
119. Id. at 883.
120. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
121. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890.
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would see hunted by every country. The Filartiga court clearly
affirmed the notion that customary international law is constantly
122
evolving and that official torture now stands on the list of crimes to
which universal jurisdiction attaches in that canon of law.
Significantly, the dynamic nature of customary international law
has come to allow U.S. courts to use it as a basis for obtaining
jurisdiction in ATCA litigation since Filartiga over substantially the
same three crimes that the ICC has jurisdiction to try criminally—
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity—through the
universal jurisdiction that U.S. courts have recognized as inherent in
these crimes. This expansion of the reach of universal jurisdiction has
been gradual but well-founded and judiciously implemented. True,
123
in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, Judge Bork denied that
customary international law had developed to include these crimes
and insisted that the ATCA only be interpreted under the law of
nations as it stood in 1789. Under this view, the only three crimes
that could violate the law of nations and thus serve as a basis for an
ATCA suit would be violations of safe conduct, infringements on the
124
rights of ambassadors, and piracy. But Judge Bork did not have the
last word on ATCA litigation.
Seven years after Tel-Oren, Congress responded directly to Judge
Bork’s criticism of the Filartiga court’s application of the ATCA. In
addition to contending that in applying the ATCA the court should
interpret the law of nations as in 1789, Judge Bork had also opined
in Tel-Oren that the ATCA identifies “a class of cases federal courts
can hear,” but does not “authorize individuals to bring such
125
126
cases.” In response, Congress enacted the TVPA to provide “a
private right of action” and “a clear and specific remedy, not limited
127
to aliens, for torture or extrajudicial killing.” Specifically, the
TVPA “authorizes the Federal courts to hear cases brought by or on
behalf of a victim of any individual who, under actual or apparent
122. Id. at 881 (“[I]t is clear that courts must interpret international law not as it was in
1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today.”).
123. 726 F.2d 774, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
124. Id. (Bork, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 811 (Bork, J., concurring). But see Dodge, supra note 39, at 224 (“Filartiga
is more consistent with the original understanding of the Alien Tort Clause than the
interpretations advanced by Judge Bork . . . .”).
126. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992)).
127. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86.
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authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation, subjects a person to
128
torture or extrajudicial killing.” Acquiescing to international law,
Congress explicitly stated that “[the TVPA] defines ‘torture’ and
‘extrajudicial killing’ in accordance with international standards,”
129
In fact, in implementing
especially the Torture Convention.
legislation for the Torture Convention in 1994, Congress further
ratified the substance of international law on this point by creating a
U.S. criminal statute allowing the Department of Justice to
prosecute foreign defendants accused of torture, wherever
130
committed. Essentially, contrary to Judge Bork’s position in TelOren, Congress encoded through the TVPA Filartiga’s notion that
international law should be interpreted as evolved rather than as it
stood in 1789.
More than a decade after Tel-Oren, ATCA litigation emerged
stronger than ever in the courts. In fact, the Second Circuit
expanded its applicability precisely on the basis of dynamic—
“ripened”—customary international law, as acknowledged by
131
Congress in passing the TVPA. In Kadic v. Karadži , a suit
against the self-proclaimed President of the breakaway Republic of
Srpska within Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Second Circuit expanded
ATCA litigation’s universal jurisdiction in two ways. First, whereas
the Second Circuit in Filartiga had found narrowly that the ATCA
applied to violators of international law, which could only be state
actors, the court in Kadic held that “certain forms of conduct violate
the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the

128. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 87.
129. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc A/39/51
(1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987). In language substantially similar to the Torture
Convention, the TVPA defines torture as
any act, directed against an individual in the offender’s custody or physical control,
by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering arising only from or
inherent in, or incidental to, lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that
individual or a third person information or a confession, punishing that individual
for an act that [an] individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of
having committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person, or for
any reason based on discrimination of any kind[.]
Pub. L. 102-256, § 3(b)(1), 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
130. Torture Convention Implementation Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-236, Title V, §
506(a), 108 Stat. 463 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340B (1994)).
131. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
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auspices of a state or only as private individuals.” Then, through
reference to customary international law as further evolved from the
time of Filartiga fifteen years before, the Kadic court certified that
133
genocide and war crimes now constitute such violations. Based on
its status in the international treaties that determine the state of
customary international law, torture retained the requirement that it
be conducted under color of state law, unless committed in the
134
course of a genocidal campaign. Thus, in ATCA litigation, U.S.
courts can now try foreign individuals for crimes committed
abroad—against foreign plaintiffs—that are substantially similar to
the crimes in the ICC Statute on the basis of universal jurisdiction
inherent in these violations of customary international law.
Furthermore, U.S. courts have accepted and incorporated definitions
of these crimes as found in customary international law in ATCA
litigation in order to obtain the universal jurisdiction that attaches.
A more recent case hailing from the same turbulent region, this
time a result of Serbian atrocities in their campaign of “ethnic
cleansing,” reinforces the U.S. incorporation of the substance of
135
four
customary international law. In Mehinovic v. Vuckovic,
Bosnian Muslim plaintiffs sued their former torturer, a Bosnian Serb,
in federal court after they discovered that the defendant had settled
in Atlanta, Georgia. The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the
defendant, previously their neighbor in the Bosnian town of
Bosanski Samac, had perpetrated a long list of human rights abuses
136
on them and others. In a straightforward decision, the court
found, based on the revolting and incredibly humiliating torture that
the defendant inflicted upon the plaintiffs, that the defendant
“committed the following violations of customary international law,
which confer jurisdiction, and establish liability, under the ATCA:
torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; arbitrary detention;

132. Id. at 239 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 240.
134. Id. at 244.
135. 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2002).
136. The complaint reads: “First Amended Complaint for Civil Conspiracy; Genocide;
War Crimes; Crimes Against Humanity; Torture; Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment;
Arbitrary Detention Without Trial; Assault and Battery; False Arrest and False Imprisonment;
and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.” Complaint, Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F.
Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (No. 1 98–CV.2470), http://www.cja.org/cases/
Mehinovic_Complaint.html.
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war crimes; and crimes against humanity.” In so holding, the court
followed Kadic and referred to both ATCA/TVPA case law and
numerous international instruments for the definitions of these
138
crimes.
Interestingly, the ICC’s definitions of crimes also closely
resemble the definitions of these crimes in customary international
139
law, and, in some cases, are even more restrictive. Such definitional
resemblance is ironic in light of the U.S. objections to the ICC
founded on universal jurisdiction and the definitions of the crimes in
the ICC Statute. It also suggests that universal jurisdiction and the
definitions of crimes in the ICC Statute do not necessarily constitute
140
insurmountable barriers to U.S. participation —for the sake of
consistency with U.S. use of these factors to justify ATCA litigation
it may even invite participation. Rather, these factors combine with
aspects of the ICC’s structure and its potential for judicial legislation
to form a countermajoritarian difficulty on an international scale that
may threaten the role of American policymakers on these issues,
which is likely the more fundamental objection to U.S. participation
in the ICC. ATCA litigation’s “plaintiff’s diplomacy” provides an
example of how such internationalized judicial legislation can
interfere with domestic policymaking.
3. The policymaking potential of “plaintiff’s diplomacy”: domestic and
international intrusion
a. Infringing on the U.S. executive. The very fact that private
plaintiffs—or the pressure groups behind them—can enter the
foreign policy arena using U.S. courts as their vehicle, as in the Falun
Gong cases, implicates a separation of powers conundrum. True, the
executive and legislative branches compete for supremacy in foreign
policy because the Constitution foresees a role for both in it. “In
periods when the president is energetic, popular and politically
adept, or when the nation is at war or threatened by foreign
141
But the
developments, the executive ordinarily is dominant.”
overlap and competition in this arena exists between the executive

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Mehinovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 1344.
See id. at 1345–55 (examining the definitions of each of the crimes separately).
See infra text accompanying notes 188–192.
See infra Part IV.B.1–2.
POWELL, supra note 66, at 5.
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and the legislative, not between the executive and the judicial
branches. Indeed, “law, including the law of the Constitution, can
provide little help in resolving most disputes over American foreign
policy. . . . Foreign-policy arguments present issues that demand
political consideration, with all the breadth of moral, social,
economic and prudential concerns that political debate can
142
encompass.” Either way, foreign policy belongs in the hands of
elected officials, not unelected federal judges.
The expansion of ATCA litigation and the goals of some of those
who use it increasingly put judges into a position where their
decisions infringe on foreign policy. Although “[n]ot every case
143
touching foreign relations is nonjusticiable,” federal judges lack the
direct political accountability to influence foreign policy. The State
Department anticipated complications inherent in such an intrusive
judiciary in Senate hearings preceding the enactment of the TVPA:
From a foreign policy perspective, we are particularly concerned
over the prospect of nuisance or harassment suits brought by
political opponents or for publicity purposes. . . . Even when the
foreign government declines to defend and a default judgment
results, such suits have the potential of creating significant
144
problems for the Executive’s management of foreign policy.

The State Department reiterated these concerns in the context of the
“plaintiff’s diplomacy” in the Falun Gong cases:
The Executive Branch has many tools at its disposal to promote
adherence to human rights in China, and it will continue to apply
those tools within the context of our broader foreign policy
interests.
....
We ask the Court in particular to take into account the potential
for reciprocal treatment of United States officials by foreign courts
in efforts to challenge U.S. government policy. In addressing these
cases, the Court should bear in mind a potential future suit by
142. Id. at 7.
143. Kadic v. Karadži, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
144. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 1629 and H.R. 1662 Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Affairs, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 28
(1990) (prepared statement of David P. Stewart, Department of State).
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individuals (including foreign nationals) in a foreign court against
U.S. officials for alleged violations of customary international law in
carrying out their official functions under the Constitution, laws
and programs of the United States (e.g., with respect to capital
punishment, or for complicity in human rights abuses by
conducting foreign relations with regimes accused of those abuses).
The Court should bear in mind the potential that the United States
145
government will intervene on behalf of its interests in such cases.

In reflecting upon the negative effect that “plaintiff’s diplomacy” can
have on foreign relations, these State Department concerns also echo
U.S. objections to the ICC.
b. Infringing on foreign governments’ policies. When ATCA
litigation intrudes on the U.S. Executive Branch’s foreign policy
prerogatives, it also necessarily engages in judicial legislation in
foreign countries. Particularly, ATCA suits against corporations
exemplify this countermajoritarianism. “By targeting major
corporations and business concerns, private plaintiffs have thus
become a diplomatic force in their own right, forcing governments
146
to pay attention at the highest levels.” These types of suits can
more successfully force reform in other countries than the Falun
Gong suits, or others like them, which make foreign government
officials—who enjoy statutory sovereign immunity while still in
office—the defendants:
[I]n most of these cases, the governments involved are of
developing countries heavily dependent on foreign investment.
They therefore find themselves caught in a painful bind. Public
pressure and the possibility of a large payout may pull a state
toward supporting a lawsuit, but the danger of scaring off future
147
investment will tug in the other direction.

In this way, federal judges may engage in judicial legislation through
ATCA/TVPA suits because some countries may prefer to change
policies rather than face “de facto sanctions” in the form of massive
145. Taft Letter, supra note 109, at 7–8; cf. Tremble, Holland, Tremble, ECONOMIST,
Sept. 1, 2001, at 27 (reporting that the U.S. “Hague Invasion Act,” or rather the pending
American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2001, which would “authorise the president to
send troops to release Americans or allies held by the international tribunal[,] . . . has not gone
down well with allies”).
146. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 25, at 107 (noting successful cases against German
corporations and Swiss banks that participated in or gained from the Holocaust).
147. Id. at 110.
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damages awards in U.S. courts against corporations doing business
in the United States and the subsequent freezing of assets from
which to pay the amounts due.
On the one hand, this judicial legislation—countermajoritarian
on an international scale or not—has an undeniably positive effect if
it stops ongoing atrocities in those countries. For example, in
148
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., the court
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss a massive class action suit
brought under the ATCA/TVPA. The Sudanese plaintiffs alleged
that the defendant, a Canadian energy company, “collaborated with
Sudan in ‘ethnically cleansing’ civilian populations surrounding oil
concessions located in southern Sudan in order to facilitate oil
149
In order to clear nonexploration and extraction activities.”
Muslim residents from southern Sudan for these activities, the
government of Sudan, which is “controlled by a ‘Taliban-style
150
resorted to “extrajudicial
Islamic fundamentalist movement,’”
killing, forced displacement, military attacks on civilian targets,
confiscation and destruction of property, kidnappings, rape, and the
151
enslavement of civilians.” A massive judgment causing Sudan to
rethink these policies—though highly unlikely—would be very
positive. On the other hand, “[r]ulings by U.S. courts cannot
substitute for the hard work of reaching consensus within foreign
152
states on respect for human rights and responsible development.”
Indeed, the product of such judicial legislation would be decidedly
countermajoritarian. And the concept of reciprocity in such areas of
law has not eluded the State Department, especially in light of the
153
United States’ use of the death penalty and dealings with regimes
that abuse human rights. The ICC’s capacity for this kind of judicial
legislation with regard to the three crimes under its jurisdiction
evokes U.S. fears that it will attempt to preempt public policy in the
United States, where a firmly established structure of ordered liberty

148. 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
149. Id. at 296.
150. Id. at 298.
151. Id. at 296.
152. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 25, at 111.
153. See generally, Patrick Hudson, Does the Death Row Phenomenon Violate a Prisoner’s
Human Rights Under International Law?, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 833 (2000) (arguing that
excessive delays on death row constitute a human rights violation and that international law
will force states to modify their procedures).
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and the political process are far better institutionally suited to engage
in this kind of policymaking.
IV. “DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT” AND THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN
DIFFICULTY IN THE ICC
The countermajoritarian difficulty enters discussion of the ICC
through a perceived “democratic deficit” inherent in the court’s
institutional nature. A similar democratic deficit exists in numerous
154
other international institutions. The existence of a democratic
deficit in the nature of the ICC implies that any judicial legislation
that results from its decisions will constitute a countermajoritarian
difficulty on an international scale. Part IV examines the concerns of
universal jurisdiction and the definitions of crimes in the ICC statute
in relation to the ICC’s capacity for judicial legislation on policy
issues relating to those crimes.
A. Jurisdiction(s) and Judicial Legislation in the ICC
The Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes at the time of the
Rome Conference, Adam Scheffer, stated in Senate hearings that one
of the “major flaws” of the ICC Statute was its “de facto universal
155
jurisdiction.” Others decried vague language in the definitions of
the three crimes over which the ICC has subject-matter
156
jurisdiction.
Neither of these constitutes an insurmountable
constitutional obstacle to U.S. ratification of the ICC Statute,
particularly since the United States has already fully endorsed them
157
and applied them in ATCA litigation. Rather, the “democratic

154. See supra Part I.B and note 42 for a discussion of the “democratic deficit” in
international organizations.
155. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 15 (statement of Hon. David J. Scheffer).
156. See, e.g., id. at 6 (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms), 59–62 (prepared statement of
Hon. John R. Bolton).
157. See, e.g., Amann & Sellers, supra note 29, at 400–04 (addressing these and other
fundamental constitutional concerns—many of them procedural—in the ICC statute and
concluding that “as long as the ICC’s practices meet minimum standards of fairness, they
should not prevent U.S. participation in the international court”); cf. Scott W. Andreasen,
Note, The International Criminal Court: Does the Constitution Preclude Its Ratification by the
United States?, 85 IOWA L. REV. 697, 701–02 (2000) (highlighting potential constitutional
concerns with procedural matters in the ICC Statute but suggesting ways to accommodate
them in the interest of facilitating U.S. participation in the ICC).
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158

posed by the nature of the ICC as an international
deficit”
institution with substantive authority poses a more formidable
constitutional objection in the form of an internationalized
countermajoritarian difficulty.
1. “De facto universal jurisdiction” against “complementarity with
teeth”
The ICC Statute indeed contains an element of true universal
jurisdiction, but that is not what Ambassador Scheffer was referring
to in identifying a major flaw of the ICC as its “de facto universal
jurisdiction” constituting a constitutional obstacle to ratification.
159
The ICC provides a “two-track system of jurisdiction.” Under the
first track, Article 13(b) gives the ICC full universal jurisdiction—as
opposed to Scheffer’s de facto universal jurisdiction—over a crime,
but only if “[a] situation in which one or more of such crimes
[referred to in Article 5] appears to have been committed is referred
to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII
160
of the Charter of the United Nations.” The concept of universal
jurisdiction allows the Security Council to prosecute these crimes
even absent the ICC.
Under the second track, Article 13(a) and (c) cover situations
referred to the ICC by states parties or by the prosecutor propio
161
motu. These referrals are restricted by the “[p]reconditions to the
162
exercise of jurisdiction” under Article 12, which provide for state

158. Forsythe, supra note 16, at 986. See supra Part I.B and text accompanying note 42
for a discussion of how international organizations often contain a perceived democratic
deficit.
159. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 73 (prepared statement of Michael P.
Scharf).
160. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 13(b); see also ICC Hearings (1998), supra note
9, at 73 (prepared statement of Michael P. Scharf) (“This track would be enforced by Security
Council imposed embargoes, the freezing of assets of leaders and their supporters, and/or by
authorizing the use of force. It is this track that the United States favored, and would be likely
to utilize in the event of a future Bosnia or Rwanda.”).
161. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 13(a), (c).
162. The full text of Article 12 reads as follows:
Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction
1. A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of
the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5.
2. In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its
jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3:

1162

FOW-FIN

1129]

9/29/2003 10:30 PM

Compounding the Countermajoritarian Difficulty
163

consent—or rather “a right to dissent” —to the ICC’s exercise of
jurisdiction over a case: “[b]efore the ICC can act, its jurisdiction
must be accepted either by the territorial state where the alleged
164
crimes occurred or by the accused’s home state.” Still, critics find
that “[t]he statute purports to give this international court
jurisdiction over American citizens even if the United States refused
165
to sign or ratify the treaty.” That is, Scheffer’s “de facto universal
jurisdiction” arises out of Article 12’s language because of the
general nature of a crime’s effect:
Since a crime is generally committed wherever an illegal act has a
harmful effect, allegedly illegal action by a person in a non-ratifying
nation that has an impact in a second, ratifying, nation will subject
that person to prosecution—even though that person’s nation has
166
not ratified the ICC Statute.

Critics fear that members of the U.S. military stationed abroad might
167
face prosecution under this de facto universal jurisdiction. But the

(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if
the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of
that vessel or aircraft;
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.
3. If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under
paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question. The
accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay or exception in
accordance with Part 9.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 12.
163. KRISTINA MISKOWIAK, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CONSENT,
COMPLEMENTARITY AND COOPERATION 24 (2000).
164. Bardavid, supra note 34, at 23.
165. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 6 (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms).
166. Wilkins, supra note 20, at 269.
167. See, e.g., Henry Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFF.,
July/Aug. 2001, at 86, 92–93; ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 6 (statement of Sen.
Jesse Helms). This is a well founded contention and even highlights how Scheffer’s de facto
jurisdiction may indeed constitute true universal jurisdiction:
[I]n certain situations jurisdiction is transferred to the Court from a state that does
not approve of the Court’s establishment nor wishes to give up sovereignty in
relation to the prosecution of its own nationals or on its own territory. It may be
inferred that the Court has, according to the Statute, a limited amount of inherent
[universal] jurisdiction in the true sense.
MISKOWIAK, supra note 163, at 25–26. Cf. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 73
(prepared statement of Michael P. Scharf) (“[T]he ICC Statute specifies that the Court would
have jurisdiction only over ‘serious’ war crimes that represent a ‘policy.’ Thus, random acts of
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ICC Statute provides further restrictions on universal jurisdiction
than requiring just the consent of the non-party state. This track is
substantially weaker than the first track because, unlike the first track,
it “would have no built-in process for enforcement, but rather would
rely on the good-faith cooperation of the Parties to the Court’s
168
statute.” The ICC might claim jurisdiction under the second track
169
over a citizen of a non-party state but could not oblige the United
States to comply with this claim by extraditing the accused to the
170
ICC. Moreover, the principle of “complementarity with teeth” —
the ICC’s admissibility requirements for jurisdiction—under Articles
1 and 17 further restricts the ICC’s jurisdiction under this second
track. Under these provisions, ICC jurisdiction over any crime is
171
complementary to the domestic jurisdiction of the states parties.
By barring the ICC from prosecuting a case that is already being
prosecuted in good faith by a state party, complementarity
constitutes a significant restriction to the ICC’s personal jurisdiction.
Furthermore, U.S. acceptance of the dynamic nature of
international law in the ATCA has at least three implications for ICC
opponents’ objections to perceived universal jurisdiction in the
Statute. First, even if U.S. law did not absorb customary
international law, under the universal jurisdiction inherent in certain
serious violations of international law, which evolves over time,
“states can already try U.S. personnel under those general provisions
[of genocide, crimes against humanity, and grave breaches of the
1949 Geneva Conventions], regardless of the new regime

U.S. personnel, such as the downing of the Iran Airbus by the USS Vincennes, would not be
subject to the Court’s jurisdiction.”).
168. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 73 (prepared statement of Michael P.
Scharf).
169. Miskowiak provides the following example to illuminate this proposition:
An American serviceman has committed war crimes of a serious nature on a large
scale in Iraq. If:
(a) the United States has failed to prosecute him for the crime; and
(b) neither the United States nor Iraq is a party to the Statute but Iraq decides
to
accept the Court’s jurisdiction with respect to the crime in question; then
the Court would have jurisdiction over the case.
MISKOWIAK, supra note 163, at 26.
170. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 35 (statement by Michael P. Scharf).
171. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at arts. 1, 17.
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constructed via the ICC.” The early case of United States v. Smith
exemplified this principle through the Court’s treatment of the
capital offense of piracy as defined in the law of nations, referring in
173
dictum to Blackstone’s hostis humani generis reasoning. Regarding
whether the listed offenses entail universal jurisdiction like their
forerunner of piracy, even if the rather bold statement is true that
“there is absolutely no authority in international cases or text to
expand universal jurisdiction over piracy to reach other customary
174
international crimes,” U.S. case law under the ATCA provides
ample authority that such expansion has indeed occurred and has
already been the basis for U.S. judgments against foreign
175
Second, because the ICC Statute will itself be
defendants.
substantial evidence of the status of customary international law on
the three crimes over which it has jurisdiction, U.S. law will
incorporate those definitions under The Paquete Habana; thus even
as a state party, the United States could evade the ICC’s universal
jurisdiction by prosecuting these violations in good faith under
Article 17’s “complementarity with teeth” principle. Finally, the
United States could also bring the codified definitions of its own
laws into convergence with the evolved definitions in customary
international law as evidenced by the ICC definitions—which are not
radically different since they are largely based on treaties to which the
United States is a party—in order to avoid entanglements with the
176
ICC’s de facto universal jurisdiction. But, of course, this prospect
anticipates the more fundamental overarching concern with the ICC:
its capacity for judicial legislation.

172. Forsythe, supra note 16, at 986–87; Kenneth Roth, The Case for Universal
Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2001, at 150, 152 (“But the United States itself
asserts such jurisdiction over others’ citizens when it prosecutes terrorists or drug traffickers,
such as Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, without the consent of the suspect’s
government.”).
173. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162 (1820).
174. Wilkins, supra note 20, at 271 (emphasis added).
175. Moreover, even outside the substantial weight of ATCA litigation—which shows
that the United States accepts the expansion of universal jurisdiction from piracy alone to
certain crimes substantially resembling the core crimes of the ICC Statute when cases are
brought in U.S. courts—the United States has accepted universal jurisdiction in relation to at
least genocide. See MISKOWIAK, supra note 163, at 27; see also supra Part III.B.2.
176. David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35
CORNELL INT’L L.J., Nov. 2001–Feb. 2002, at 47, 98.
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2. Void for vagueness? The subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC
Problems with the language in the definitions of the crimes may
be the easiest flaws of the ICC to fix vis-à-vis U.S. constitutional
concerns, but only if the United States remains in a position to
participate in the development of the court and its jurisprudence.
Even proponents of the Statute admit that “there are areas of the
177
Rome Statute that are vague and poorly drafted.” In addition to
vague and ambiguous points in the definitions of the three crimes
178
within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction—genocide, crimes
179
180
against humanity, and war crimes —the ICC Statute also provides
181
for future inclusion of a crime of “aggression.” The addition of the
new crime can occur following a statutory delay of seven years after
182
the ICC Statute comes into effect and pursuant to a two-thirds
183
majority of states parties. The prospect of adding the crime of
184
aggression to the enumerated list greatly worries critics
and
185
disappoints some moderate proponents. But because any definition
of aggression “shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the

177. Bardavid, supra note 34, at 27.
178. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 6.
179. Id. at art. 7.
180. Id. at art. 8.
181. Id. at art. 5(1)(d), (2). Concerning the future crime of aggression, this article of the
Rome Statute provides the following:
The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is
adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out
the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this
crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations.
Id. at art. 5(2).
182. Id. at art. 121(1) (“After the expiry of seven years from the entry into force of this
Statute, any State Party may propose amendments thereto. The text of any proposed
amendment shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall
promptly circulate it to all State Parties.”); see also id. at art. 123(1).
183. Id. at art. 121(2)–(3).
184. See, e.g., ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 6 (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms).
Helms stated:
Well, I think I can anticipate what will constitute a crime of aggression in the eyes of
this court. It will be a crime of aggression when the United States of America takes
any military action to defend the national interest of the American people unless the
United States first seeks and receives the permission of the United Nations. And I
say baloney to that.
Id. (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms).
185. See, e.g., Bardavid, supra note 34, at 27.
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Charter of the United Nations,” the ICC “will give deference to
the Security Council to determine whether an act of aggression has
187
occurred,” which the United States would view favorably. As an
outsider to the treaty, however, the United States cannot contribute
to the creation of a satisfactory definition of aggression or prevent
the court from adding such a definition.
Some ambiguity exists in the language of the other three
enumerated crimes, but not to the extent that it would render them
void for vagueness under constitutional ex post facto concerns.
Indeed, “the provisions on crimes against humanity and war crimes
were scrubbed and negotiated with tireless effort by U.S.
188
negotiators, including in Rome.” The result was a list of three
crimes all with “demarcated definitions which are, in most cases,
considered more limited than their definitions in general
189
The definition of the crime of genocide
international law.”
“mirrors the text of the [Genocide] Convention [of 1948]
190
verbatim.” The definition for crimes against humanity predicates
the crime on committing the proscribed acts “as part of a widespread
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
191
Finally, war crimes can only be
knowledge of the attack.”
committed as “part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale
192
commission of such crimes.” These definitions have largely been
incorporated into U.S. case law under ATCA litigation. But the
components of crimes against humanity include ambiguous terms
such as “forced pregnancy” and “persecution.”
Certain pressure groups and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) have made obvious their intention to exploit ambiguities in
the ICC Statute to achieve their own radical agendas. This could
conceivably have adverse effects, e.g., for the free exercise of
193
Although this abuse of an international
traditional religions.

186. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 5(2).
187. Bardavid, supra note 34, at 26.
188. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 17 (statement of Hon. David J. Scheffer).
189. Bardavid, supra note 34, at 24.
190. Id. at 25.
191. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 7(1).
192. Id. at art. 8(1).
193. See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 20, at 273, 279, 283–87 (relaying the overt intention
of pressure groups “hostile to religion and traditional values,” to use the court to achieve ends
amounting to social engineering).
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institution meant “to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the
194
most serious crimes of international concern” is aggravating, it
does not mean that such groups will be successful in their efforts. To
the contrary, during the negotiations leading up to the Rome
Statute, NGO Family Voice, a conservative pressure group,
successfully lobbied against the attempts of such groups to insert
ambiguous and exploitable language under the head of crimes
against humanity in the form of a component vaguely described as
195
“deprivation of liberty.” NGO Family Voice, working with other
conservative pressure groups and governments, changed this
ambiguous language to the more exact definition that now stands:
“severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental
196
rules of international law.” It stands to reason that continued effort
will produce similar results, just as the U.S. delegation was able to
197
achieve the great majority of its objectives in the negotiations, as
testified by Article 17’s “complementarity with teeth” provision.
This and the other concessions made by the conference body to U.S.
wishes in the negotiations “were sufficient for the other major
198
powers, specifically the United Kingdom, France, and Russia.”
And the NGOs hostile to traditional values enjoy the same freedom
to promote changes favorable to their views as do the NGOs
defending religion and traditional values.
In fact, in an ironic application of the same logic employed to
suggest the ICC may enable the persecution of traditional religions,
the ICC could actually put itself into the position of defending the
free exercise of religion against abuses by both obvious and
seemingly unlikely perpetrators. Of course, under this slippery slope
199
logic, groups like the Falun Gong could resort to a centralized,
194. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 1.
195. Richard G. Wilkins et al., The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 5 (1999)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (describing NGO Family Voice’s activities while
at the Rome Conference negotiations and their various successes in contributing to the ICC
Statute).
196. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 7(1)(e).
197. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 12 (statement of Hon. David J. Scheffer)
(listing the numerous specific objectives that the body of the conference conceded to the U.S.
delegation).
198. Id. at 36 (statement by Michael P. Scharf).
199. For treatment of the Falun Gong’s attempt to use the ATCA to achieve policy
change in China’s human rights record, see supra Part III.B.1 and supra text accompanying
notes 95–110.
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international body in the ICC and seek criminal prosecution for the
abuses they have suffered. Perhaps this recourse would free the Falun
Gong from the danger of retribution for filing civil suits in the
United States, to whose law China does not consent; or it might
eventually prevent the abuses in the first place, especially if
subordinates “cannot raise ‘following orders’ as a defense to their
prosecution under the ICC statute . . . ; the fact that he was
200
commanded by a superior is irrelevant.” In the case of seemingly
unlikely persecutors, developments hostile to the free exercise of
religion have been surfacing lately in Western democracies such as
201
202
203
204
Germany,
Belgium,
and Russia.
With their
France,
commitment to the rule of law and their dependence on
205
international law, the prospect of prosecution in the ICC might
actually promote a higher level of religious toleration in these
countries. Of course, this, like the argument that the ICC will be
used against leaders of traditional religions, is off base since the ICC
only has jurisdiction over the three crimes enumerated in the statute.
It merely illustrates that the same slippery slope logic can be applied
both ways in relation to the ICC’s jurisdiction and definitions of
200. Wilkins, supra note 20, at 281 n.12.
201. Jacques Robert, Religious Liberty and French Secularism, 2003 BYU L. REV. 637.
In France, a juridical theory of secte [“cult” or “dangerous sect”] has been
painstakingly elaborated after many years and through a constant flow of often
passionate debates. This theory distinguishes sectes from religions; thus, the theory
does not provide sectes with the same protection provided to religions by
international texts.
Id. at 647. Professor Robert notes that in France, “there remains a de facto regime of
‘recognized religions’ consisting of the Catholic Church, the Reformed Church, the Lutheran
Church, and the Jewish religion,” and that any other religions “are simply ‘tolerated’ and do
not enjoy ‘official status.’” Id. at 647 n.23.
202. Gerhard Robbers, Religious Freedom in Germany, 2001 BYU L. REV. 643, 650–51
(discussing the struggle of the Jehovah’s Witnesses in the German courts to gain the status of a
public corporation).
203. Adelbert Denaux, The Attitude of Belgian Authorities Toward New Religious
Movements, 2002 BYU L. REV. 237, 240 (arguing that the appearance of 189 religious
organizations—“new religious movements”—on an official list of the Information and Advice
Center Concerning Harmful Sectarian Organizations in no way implied that groups included
in the list were “harmful” or “sectarian”).
204. J. Brian Gross, Comment, Russia’s War on Religious and Political Extremism: An
Appraisal of the Law “On Counteracting Extremist Activity,” 2003 BYU L. REV. 717, 737–58
(analyzing the broad potential for abuse in Russia’s new Extremism Law and comparing it to
the heavy-handed approach taken to religion in other related laws in Russia in the mid and late
1990s).
205. See KAGAN, supra note 46, at 5, 37.
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crimes. But still, the fact that some NGOs so openly express their
intent to use the ICC to promote changes in national laws in their
respective countries emphasizes the ICC’s capacity for judicial
legislation, which would constitute a far greater constitutional
obstacle than vague—but changeable—language in the ICC Statute.
B. Analyzing the “Democratic Deficit” in the
Structure and Function of the ICC
From a U.S. perspective, the institutional structure of the ICC
and the ICC’s substantive decision-making power combine to form a
countermajoritarian difficulty that is perceived as an infringement of
American constitutional principles. But through the Supreme
Court’s well-established tradition of judicial review, the
countermajoritarian difficulty already raises constitutional concerns
from within the United States. Despite these concerns, judicial
review is grudgingly accepted since it has been part of the U.S.
structure of ordered liberty for more than two hundred years. But
the appearance of the countermajoritarian difficulty in the ICC
enjoys far less tolerance in the United States.
1. Structural implications of the “democratic deficit”
Some of the most cogent U.S. objections to the ICC revolve
around the practical results implicit in the structure of the ICC, the
relationship of the world’s inhabitants to the ICC, and in the types
of decisions that the ICC will be institutionally suited to make.
206
Under this structural argument, critics of the ICC universally decry
the fact that the ICC “circumvent[s] the authority of the Security
207
Council,” which, until the ICC Statute, had the sole responsibility
to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and . . . [to] decide what measures shall
208
be taken.” Because all of the crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction
also fall within the Security Council’s jurisdiction, the United States

206. See, e.g., Amann & Sellers, supra note 29, at 390–91 (“Underlying all these
objections is the claim that the ICC structure is less democratic, and so less independent, than
U.S. domestic political and judicial institutions.”).
207. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 1 (statement of Sen. Rod Grams).
208. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
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argued for a “Security Council-controlled Court,” which would
only have jurisdiction over matters referred to it by the Security
Council. This prior review would allow any permanent member of
the Security Council to veto the recommended criminal prosecution.
But because the ICC was intentionally created as a body
independent of the United Nations, this idea did not become reality.
The Security Council still plays a role in safeguarding against
politically motivated prosecutions through the option to halt an
investigation, but in this case the U.S. veto does not work to its
advantage because “revoking an indictment is subject to the veto of
210
any permanent Security Council member.”
As a body outside the control of the U.N., the ICC manifests a
democratic deficit in its structure. “The ICC’s principal difficulty is
that its components do not fit into a coherent ‘constitutional’
structure that clearly delineates how laws are made, adjudicated and
enforced, subject to popular accountability and structured to protect
liberty. Instead, the Court and the Prosecutor are simply ‘out there’
211
in the international system . . . .” Without being embedded in a
more distinct “constitutional structure” that provides ascertainable
accountability, and in light of the capability of any state party or the
prosecutor propio motu to initiate an investigation, the ICC will be in
the perfect position to make policy by the very nature of its
institutional framework. “So the argument runs, the ICC will make a
number of very broad judgments, not just narrow and technical
212
ones.” At this point the structural argument spills over into the
prudential argument against the ICC.
2. Prudential implications of the “democratic deficit”
The prudential argument highlights a different type of
democratic deficit in the way the court functions that would seem to
render the ICC institutionally unsuited to adjudicate because of the
certainty that judicial legislation or policymaking will result from its
actions. The ICC Statute provides for an Assembly of States Parties

209.
Scharf).
210.
211.
Bolton).
212.

ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 73 (prepared statement of Michael P.
See Kissinger, supra note 167, at 94.
ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 58 (prepared statement of Hon. John R.
Forsythe, supra note 16, at 986.
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214

in which each state party has one vote for electing and removing
215
the eighteen judges on the court and the prosecutor. The judges
must be qualified as “persons of high moral character, impartiality
and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their
216
respective states for appointment to the highest judicial offices.” In
this context, the idea of democratic deficit applies not to the
217
selection process of the judges, which is democratic, but rather to
the nature of the states voting on the judges and the prosecutor:
“nondemocratic governments could control the personnel and
218
activities of the ICC.” That is, “the judges will not be confined to
219
those from democratic countries with rule of law.” Because of the
perceived democratic deficit in the identity of its judges, under this
prudential argument, the ICC will not be institutionally suited to
make decisions that are likely to set policy in democratic states with
the rule of law. This is particularly the case because of how even the
safeguard of “complementarity with teeth” could function as an
“international supremacy clause”:
Rather than protecting national sovereignty and local democratic
self-determination, the concept [of “complementarity”] operates
much like an international supremacy clause. In essence, it is a
back-hand way of asserting that the ICC’s rules govern. Whenever
a nation departs from an ICC ruling, it will be found unwilling or
unable to follow ICC law, thereby triggering complementary
220
jurisdiction.

213. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 36(6)(a).
214. Id. at art. 46(2)(a).
215. Id. at arts. 42(4), 46(2)(b).
216. Id. at art. 36(3)(a).
217. Stated succinctly, the judges “are elected to single nonrenewable nine-year terms by
a majority [two-thirds] vote of state parties. The judges selected are to represent the ‘principal
legal systems of the world’ with no two being from the same state.” Bardavid, supra note 34,
at 22. But see Nye, supra note 42, at 4 (“But who are ‘we the people’ in a world where political
identity at the global level is so weak? ‘One state, one vote’ is not democratic.”).
218. Amann & Sellers, supra note 29, at 388.
219. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 3 (statement of Sen. Rod Grams).
220. Wilkins, supra note 20, at 272–73; see also ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at
19 (statement of Hon. David J. Scheffer). Scheffer notes:
There are provisions in this treaty that would require governments to change their
national laws in order to comply with the provisions of this treaty, particularly with
respect to the surrender or transfer of individuals on their territory to the treaty.
There would have to be changes in certain national laws to facilitate that and the
implementing legislation.
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In this sense, the ICC Statute demands identification of national laws
with its definitions of the three crimes under its jurisdiction in order
to take full advantage of the principle of complementarity.
Essentially, this exemplifies the countermajoritarian difficulty of the
ICC because the judges, as a product of the structural and prudential
democratic deficit, will have this capacity to effect changes in the
laws of the states themselves, thus exercising a certain degree of
power over the states’ democratically elected legislatures.
3. Facing America’s real
countermajoritarian difficulty

problem

with

the

ICC:

The

Undoubtedly, the institutional nature of the ICC as outside the
exclusive control of the Security Council will allow it to make policy
in some respects by virtue of its independence. Furthermore, the
notion of complementarity implies that judges, including those who
have been elected from “nondemocratic states,” will be able to
influence social policy within the states parties themselves. Together,
the structural argument and the prudential argument illuminate the
countermajoritarian difficulty of the ICC.
However, the ICC provides safeguards against the adverse effects
of this countermajoritarian factor while also striving to empower the
two most positive aspects of such countermajoritarianism. These two
factors are stability and principled decision making (i.e., making
decisions in the interest of long-term considerations, rather than for
the immediate end of getting re-elected), which also render federal
courts institutionally suited to adjudicate in U.S. judicial review
jurisprudence. For example, the ICC Statute greatly inhibits
politically motivated prosecutions, one of the biggest fears arising
out of the structural argument’s concern with the prosecutor’s propio
221
motu powers, in at least two ways. First, a prosecutor must submit
a proposal for any investigation to the judges of the Pre-Trial
Chamber who may by majority vote stop the investigation if they
222
find a lack of genuine substance. Second, there is accountability in

ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 19 (statement of Hon. David J. Scheffer).
221. See generally Mumford, supra note 35, at 174–80.
222. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 15(4). In the Senate hearings, Professor Scharf
expatiated on these safeguards:
Let us say that the United States does something very controversial. It decides
to invade another country. The rest of the world does not think that that was in self-
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the structure of the ICC: “the prosecutor and judges of the ICC do
223
answer to the assembly of states parties, which elected them.” The
ICC Statute also protects the independence of the judges,
224
prohibiting any kind of undue influence in their activities. Indeed,
[t]he court is sufficiently independent. The judges and prosecutors
are elected from amongst the party states to non-renewable
terms—thus they are insulated from the politics of re-election. The
Security Council, outside of the crime of aggression, cannot hinder
the operation of the court (except upon unanimous vote where
they can temporarily block prosecution). These are significant
guarantees that, at least on paper, the court can remain sufficiently
225
isolated from political pressures.

These protections do not erase the countermajoritarian difficulty
inherent in the activity of the ICC, but they do render it less
constitutionally dangerous to the United States as a state party.
The mere existence of a countermajoritarian difficulty in the ICC
need not be a constitutional impediment to U.S. ratification. As
shown by the Supreme Court’s method of enforcing the
fundamental purpose of the U.S. Bill of Rights—the protection of
the minority from majority tyranny—through its tradition of
defense and decides to indict our Secretary of Defense or even our President. What
would happen under that scenario?
Well, what would happen is at the first level, the United States would say this is
not part of the Court’s jurisdiction because this is not a serious war crime, and if the
prosecutor does his or her job, they will decide, no, this is not what the Court was
about. This is not a serious war crime. This is not of the level of genocide. This is a
peacekeeping effort. This is something that is appropriate. But we cannot trust the
prosecutor to do his job. You do not know.
So, then the prosecutor has to go to the three-judge panel, and you hope that
two of those judges will see the light. But if they do not, then you have to go to the
full panel of all of the judges. During this time period, the United States can stop it
in other ways. If we do our own investigation like a Lieutenant Calley, what if our
Secretary of Defense was doing a rogue operation? We could investigate and we
could decide to prosecute, in which case it turns off the Court, or we could decide
that there is no grounds for prosecution, but that we made that decision in good
faith, which also turns off the Court and that decision is appealable.
Finally, we can go to our friends on the Security Council and say, look, you do
not want your leaders to be brought before the Court. Join us in voting to turn off
the Court. The five permanent members are very likely to join us, and if we can get
four out of the other nine members to do so, then the Security Council can stop.
ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 40 (statement by Michael P. Scharf).
223. Forsythe, supra note 16, at 986.
224. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 40.
225. Bardavid, supra note 34, at 27.
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countermajoritarian judicial review, “legitimacy can come from
227
other than majority rule.” “This argument,” proceeds Professor
Forsythe, “is based in part on the observation that all liberal
democracies restrain majority rule by independent courts with
appointed judges for the precise intent of protecting human rights
228
from the tyranny of the majority.” And as an outsider to the ICC,
the United States will not be able to make use of the democratic
processes set up in the ICC for making amendments to provisions
deemed problematic from the U.S. perspective. This point is
particularly germane to the U.S. concern about the democratic
deficit in the identity of the ICC’s judges and how that affects the
ICC’s institutional penchant for judicial legislation on social policy
concerning the crimes under its jurisdiction.
Only as a State Party would the United States be entitled to
nominate candidates for ICC judges and vote for [or against] the
election of all judges. Only nationals of States Parties may be
elected judges, so a U.S. national, in most cases, could only
become a judge if the United States is a State Party. Only as a State
Party would the United States be entitled to vote for the
229
Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutors.

Finally, even taking for granted the democratic deficit inherent in
the structure and function of the ICC, the countermajoritarian
difficulty that naturally results does not necessarily render the
230
Despite the
institution itself fundamentally undemocratic.
countermajoritarian aspects of the ICC, it surely still “operates under
public scrutiny and criticism—but not at all times or in all parts [at
once]. What we mean by democracy, therefore, is much more
sophisticated and complex than the making of decisions in town
231
meeting by a show of hands.” “Democracy,” in this broader sense,
demands active participation to be successful for the individual.

226. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
227. Forsythe, supra note 16, at 986. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of how the
countermajoritarian difficulty is more of an integral part of the republican U.S. system of
government than deviant to it.
228. Forsythe, supra note 16, at 986.
229. Scheffer, supra note 176, at 97.
230. See supra Part II.B.
231. BICKEL, supra note 32, at 17.
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V. CONCLUSION
The ICC aims to bring those who commit genocide, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity to justice. In response to those praising
the ICC as a deterrent to these crimes by ending impunity, some
doubt the efficacy of the ICC’s de facto universal jurisdiction as a
232
deterrent to these crimes. But significantly, “this [deterrent] effect
should not be overstated. . . . The key rationale for the exercise of
233
universal jurisdiction, therefore, is not deterrence but justice.” This
234
rationale applies with equal force to ATCA litigation, in which
U.S. courts have been allowing individuals to seek justice through
the exercise of universal jurisdiction over aliens since 1980. The
result has been a “plaintiff’s diplomacy” that contradicts the U.S.
stance against the ICC. Whereas the countermajoritarian difficulty
inherent in the ICC is centralized and applies to all nations that
consent to its jurisprudence through ratification of the ICC Statute,
U.S. ATCA litigation subjects aliens of nations that have not
subscribed to U.S. law to federal subject matter jurisdiction based on
universal jurisdiction attached to certain violations of customary
international law. U.S. economic and military might has contributed
to ATCA litigation’s capacity to dictate political and social policy in
these countries, and such dominance will also perpetuate the
asymmetry between the exportation of U.S. law in ATCA litigation
and the U.S. rejection of the ICC.
In the end, even the countermajoritarian difficulty of the ICC—
America’s real problem with the ICC—does not strictly prohibit
U.S. participation in that body; rather, the nature of the real world,
or the way the United States views the world, precludes U.S.
submission to the ICC at the present time. America has been living
in the harsh, Hobbesian world where Realpolitik reigns and where
since 1945 “international law regarding peace and security is largely
235
whatever the Security Council says that it is.” In this world, the
“mass murderers and ethnic cleansers [in this century] . . . got away
232. See ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 50 (prepared statement of Hon. John R.
Bolton) (arguing that “the deterrence argument has no empirical foundation”); Wilkins, supra
note 20, at 278 (suggesting that arguments for deterrence only have force in an “ideal utopian
world”).
233. Kamminga, supra note 79, at 943–44.
234. See supra Part III.B.1–2 for a discussion of the ATCA’s goal of prevention
alongside, or perhaps even above and beyond, recovery of damages.
235. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 1 (statement of Sen. Rod Grams).
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with their crimes because no one dispatched soldiers to challenge
them, not because there were no lawyers dispatched to indict them.
236
Prosecutors do not deter evil. Armies do.” Everyone is a threat;
power is a zero-sum game; one cannot trust a neighbor to follow
one’s lead in retiring the “big stick.”
Saddam Hussein’s evasion of the conditions in the Security
Council Resolutions that ended the Gulf War in 1991 illustrates the
weakness of unenforceable international law. Hussein neither
respected international law nor feared prosecution in the ICC, as
reflected by his ousting of the weapons inspectors and subversive
actions in developing weapons of mass destruction. The success
France claimed in influencing Hussein to destroy a few token missiles
in the campaign to seek a peaceful disarmament—the original
condition for cessation of conflict in the Gulf War of 1991—in the
weeks preceding the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 more likely
derived from the threat of U.S. troops amassing on Hussein’s
border, than from a mutual submission to international law.
Given this American skepticism of the force of international law,
it is not surprising that the United States continues to reject the ICC
while European countries have largely embraced it. This
constellation might be explained as a function of power:
Europe’s relative weakness has understandably produced a powerful
European interest in building a world where military strength and
hard power matter less than economic and soft power, an
international order where international law and international
institutions matter more than the power of individual nations. . . .
Europeans have a deep interest in devaluing and eventually
eradicating the brutal laws of an anarchic Hobbesian world where
power is the ultimate determinant of national security and
237
success.

The United States, on the other hand, still values military
strength and hard power in deterring despots and human rights
abusers. The Hitlers, Stalins, Pol Pots, Pinochets, Osama bin Ladens,
and Saddam Husseins of the world do not fear a potential
prosecution in the ICC—where torture or even the death penalty
would be unthinkable as a just desert—for the atrocities they inflict.
236. Mumford, supra note 35, at 171 (alterations in original) (quoting Editorial,
Courting Disaster, NEW REPUBLIC, July 13, 1998, at 7).
237. KAGAN, supra note 46, at 37.
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But they might think twice if 250,000 U.S. and Coalition troops are
amassed on their borders. This nature of things is an indictment on
the “Hobbesian” world, and not necessarily on the United States for
238
being an “arrogant superpower” in seeking to protect itself from
what it sees as yet another threat—the new ICC. But even if
international law successfully “eradicat[ed] the brutal laws of an
239
anarchic Hobbesian world,” U.S. ATCA litigation would still be
inconsistent with U.S. constitutional concerns about the ICC.
Specifically, “[r]ulings by U.S. courts [through ATCA litigation]
cannot substitute for the hard work of reaching consensus within
foreign states on respect for human rights and responsible
240
development.” This type of judicial legislation in foreign countries
engaged in by U.S. judges through ATCA litigation compounds the
countermajoritarian difficulty by preempting the responsibility of
foreign legislatures more institutionally suited to make those kinds of
decisions. Still, U.S. ATCA litigation might not be as problematic or
intrusive for other countries if the United States were a state party to
the ICC Statute. In that case, the United States would consent
together with the other states parties to the jurisdiction of the ICC—
a central body with the same relationship to all states parties—over
substantially the same crimes that form the basis of ATCA suits in
the United States. Then the world might simply view the United
States as providing a civil remedy for crimes that are subject to
criminal attention in the ICC, rather than as an imperial superpower
setting up “supercourts” of its own while shunning the real world
courts.
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